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PRE-COMMENCEMENT DISCOVERY AND THE ODEX 
LITIGATION: COPYRIGHT VERSUS CONFIDENTIALITY  
OR IS IT PRIVACY? 
This article examines whether internet service providers are 
under any duty to disclose the names of subscribers whose 
accounts can be shown to be associated with infringing 
activity. This question involves tension between the economic 
interests of copyright owners/licensees, the privacy interests 
of internet users and the economic interests of the internet 
service provider. This tension in turn raises age-old problems 
of balance and proportionality between privacy, 
confidentiality and other competing rights and freedoms as 
well as the interests of society at large. The article concludes 
by briefly touching on privacy areas from outside of 
copyright and the Internet: including the increasingly 
important area of biomedical privacy. 
George WEI Sze Shun 
Diploma in Law (SOAS), LLM (UCL); 
Barrister (Inner Temple, London), Barrister (Hong Kong), 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University 
I. Introduction 
1 The opening decade of the new millennium has witnessed new 
life in a very old and venerable social concept: individualism and rights 
of privacy. For some, privacy may be rather formless or amoebic in 
appearance. Indeed, amoebas are shapeless, simple and ubiquitous: but, 
perhaps from an evolutionary point of view, this is also their strength. 
Amoebas probably evolved fairly early in the development of the 
evolutionary tree of life: they were likely around during the age of 
dinosaurs and unless mankind destroys all life on earth will still be 
around at the end of time when our planet is consumed by the sun or 
some such similar cosmic disaster. Similarly, however hard it may be to 
pin privacy down, few will doubt that the basic premise of a right to be 
let alone has been around since the dawn of modern civilization. 
2 Individualism, privacy, freedoms, rights, obligations, 
responsibility and society: this is the perennial melting pot of ideas, 
values and principles in which privacy has been bubbling these many 
years. In recent years, hardly a day goes by without some reference in 
news media to privacy driven issues: up skirt photographs of 
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unsuspecting members of the public, bedroom scenes exposed on the 
Internet, personal contact data and mass marketing, digital shadows, 
spam, data banks, CCTV cameras, DNA profiling, industrial espionage, 
computer hacking, cookies and other types of internet usage profiling, 
medical databases and so forth.1 
3 Individuals complaining have ranged from those who are 
famous by choice (actors, fashion models) to those who have had fame 
thrust on them (princes and princesses) all the way through to those 
who choose to live in blissful anonymity. All are individuals or those 
who claim to represent interests of individuals. 
4 That famous unemotional Human/Vulcan, Commander Spock 
of the starship Enterprise, who had been asked by his very human and 
emotional friend/philosopher, Captain James T Kirk why he was 
sacrificing his life to save the Enterprise, replied to the effect: “because 
the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few or the one.” Yet 
later, when Kirk and his brave crew had made enormous sacrifices 
including the destruction of the Enterprise to restore Spock’s “spirit” to 
his reborn body and Kirk was asked by Spock why he did this, Kirk was 
able to get in the proverbial and very human last word: “because 
sometimes the needs of the one, outweighs the needs of the many!”2 
5 Much has been written on the relative importance of privacy 
and other rights, freedoms and the interests and needs of society as a 
whole. Society of course depends on social interaction and social 
intercourse. It requires the building of a community and collective 
responses and responsibilities and sacrifices for the good of the whole. 
No man is an island entire of itself.3 We are all connected to and part of 
the greater whole. And yet, perhaps the most powerful argument in 
favour of privacy and individual self-autonomy, including informational 
self-autonomy, is that it creates the conditions necessary for social 
intercourse, social interaction and the development of individual 
potential leading towards the advancement of society and civilization. 
Great leaders in politics, government, business, science, industry and 
society at large tend to be unique special individuals: persons who were 
                                                                       
1 See, for example, Tan Weizhen, “Your Digital Shadow lets Others Pick up Data 
about You” The Straits Times (18 April 2008) at p H3. 
2 See Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan and Star Trek III: The Search for Spock. 
3 John Donne, Meditation XVII and quoted by Warren Chik, “The Lion, The Dragon 
and the Wardrobe Guarding the Doorway to Information and Communications 
Privacy on the Internet: A Comparative Case Study of Hong Kong and Singapore – 
Two Differing Asian Approaches” (2006) 14 Int’l JL & InfoTech at 47. Chik 
explains that the statement “encapsulates the human need for contact and social 
interaction. The eternal tension between co-habitation and the desire for personal 
space between humans has led to compromises in what is known as the social 
contract …”. 
(2008) 20 SAcLJ Pre-commencement Discovery and Odex 593 
 
there at the right time with the right personal history, character, abilities 
and idiosyncrasies. 
6 This is not the time and place to rehearse all the arguments as to 
why privacy is important. It is perhaps enough to recall that privacy, 
together with all the other rights and freedoms that we have come to 
expect as an individual in society, come with responsibilities and duties 
to our fellow human beings and indeed society as a whole. No right or 
freedom is absolute or free from corresponding duties and 
responsibilities. Privacy is not the enemy of freedom of expression or 
freedom of information. Privacy, in some senses, is an individual’s 
ultimate freedom of expression. Social relationships do not develop on 
the basis of the principle: all human relationships are equal in terms of 
their intimacy and degrees of trust. Some social relationships, by 
individual choice are more equal than other social relationships. In 
other cases, duties and responsibilities to society as a whole may require 
greater informational transparency in the name of the needs of the 
many. 
7 With perhaps one exception, nowhere is the debate over privacy 
and social responsibility greater than in connection with that mighty 
engine of the modern information technology age, the Internet and the 
World Wide Web! The exception comprises that other great science 
driven “ology” of the 20th century: biotechnology, life sciences and 
personally identifiable genetic information. Marry these together and 
the need for balanced and proportionate responses in the 21st century 
becomes deeply underscored. 
8 What the Odex litigation4 in Singapore amply demonstrates is 
that the absence of a stand alone recognised right of privacy does not 
mean that privacy does not play an important (possibly increasing) role 
in shaping and encouraging the evolution of legal principles or by being 
taken account of simply as an important factor in exercising and 
guiding judicial discretion. 
9 This article discusses privacy and confidentiality in the context 
of applications by aggrieved persons to discover the identity of 
intellectual property (“IP”) infringers. The cloak of anonymity afforded 
by the Internet has made the task of enforcing intellectual property (and 
other rights such as those protecting reputational interests) increasingly 
problematic. The intellectual property right (“IPR”) owners and those 
whose business depends on commercial exploitation of IP assets 
demand access to information as to the identity of infringers. Efficient 
and effective procedures are needed. Home subscribers to the Internet 
and internet access service providers may beg to differ: citing privacy, 
                                                                       
4 Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2007] SGDC 248; [2008] 3 SLR 18 (“Odex”). 
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confidentiality, business inconvenience and in some cases a 
philosophical or jurisprudential disagreement with the notion of strong 
copyright and the information society. Given judicial recognition of the 
importance of privacy as a public policy or public interest factor in the 
resolution of the conflict between these competing interests, this article 
concludes by identifying some other areas (including some from within 
biomedical research) where privacy is becoming a hotly debated issue.5 
II. What was the Odex litigation about? 
10 Odex concerns copyright, confidentiality, privacy and the 
Internet. Odex is about the Internet as a tool for disseminating 
information, as a vehicle for commerce and as a community of users. 
The internet community is huge: at once both national and 
international and made up of the same range of disparate but connected 
and overlapping interests that make up the international real world 
community of individuals, businesses and societies. 
11 There are creators, authors, publishers, traders and businesses 
that see the Internet as a tool to reach a worldwide audience. There are 
educators who see the Internet as a valuable educational tool capable of 
providing a more level playing field in this information rich world. 
There are students and individuals who see the Internet as a means of 
self-expression as well as a means of providing or accessing 
entertainment and fun orientated products/services. There are, indeed, 
many more groups of users within the community of the Internet with 
different needs, interests and wants. 
12 Shorn of the technicalities, Odex is ultimately about rights and 
responsibilities: about freedom and obligations. It is about the need for 
proportionality and balance: respect for all the different needs, interests 
and wants of different groups within society. 
A. Odex, the users and Pacific Internet: The copyright setting 
13 Odex is a Singapore company claiming to have acquired the 
rights to distribute “anime titles” in the Singapore (and regional) 
market. These anime titles were assumed to enjoy copyright in 
Singapore as species of cinematograph films (videos). The copyright in 
Singapore belonged to Japanese owners and much time was spent 
determining the precise legal relationship between Odex and the 
                                                                       
5 This article arises from a presentation on Norwich Pharmacal: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Privacy made at Singapore Academy of Law Expert Series 
Seminar/Conference (with the Singapore Bioethics Advisory Committee) on 
15 May 2008 dealing with Biomedical Research and Privacy. 
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Japanese copyright owners.6 Various permutations were possible: that 
Odex was an exclusive licensee for the Singapore market; that Odex was 
a non-exclusive licensee; that Odex was a sub-licensee of the main 
licensee for Singapore; that Odex was generally empowered to act as 
agent to protect the interests of the Japanese copyright owners. 
14 The relationship issue in the Odex case was important as it dealt 
with the question as to whether Odex enjoyed the legal standing (locus 
standi) to sue for copyright infringement in its own name and to apply 
to the court for discovery orders. Whilst the matter of locus standi is 
largely a question of “internal” copyright law, it will be touched on 
briefly below as it does impact on the need to ensure a proper balancing 
of the rights and interests of copyright owners, copyright business 
interests and the interests of users and the public in general. 
15 What then were the alleged wrongdoings? The complaint 
essentially was that individual home users/subscribers of the Internet 
had infringed the copyright in the video titles: essentially by 
making/uploading unauthorised copies in individual computers linked 
to the Internet, resulting in further copies being downloaded and copied 
by other users of the Internet. Odex concerned “file swapping” similar to 
the copying which has given rise to litigation in other countries in 
connection with the use of P2P software. On the information available 
(bearing in mind that no final determination was made), it is reasonably 
clear that some of the individual users/subscribers 
uploading/downloading the anime copies were likely to have committed 
copyright infringement and that (at least on first sight) there was 
probably no applicable defence. Some of these users/subscribers might 
have also committed a criminal offence under the Copyright Act 
(whether in respect of uploading and/or downloading of copies).7 
                                                                       
6 In some cases, it may be that the licensee has created some derivative material 
associated with the licensed use: such as translations or subtitles. Query whether in 
some of these cases, the licensee can assert an independent copyright in the 
translation/subtitles as literary works and/or compilations? 
7 Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed). Note AP Burton Ong has said that questions 
may arise over the fair dealing defence if it can be shown that the downloads do not 
undermine the commercial viability of the anime industry (taking account of all 
other relevant considerations). Doubtless this will be contested by the copyright 
owners and will need very careful consideration. See the entry in Wikipedia 
(accessed April 2008), Odex’s actions against file-sharing at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odex’s_actions_against_file-sharing. Nevertheless, 
Professor Ong is quite right to raise the fair dealing issue. As for possible criminal 
responsibility under s 136(3A) of the Copyright Act (based on wilful and 
significant infringement), this is a complex provision whose interpretation is not 
entirely free of doubt. In particular, there must be some ambiguity as to when 
infringement is “significant” for the purposes of the criminal provisions. Note also 
that, in some cases, the user who uploads the copy for other users (including those 
in Singapore) to download using P2P software may well be located overseas. For 
articles on s 136(3A), see Saw Cheng Lim & Susanna Leong, “Criminalising 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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16 What then was the harm caused to Odex? Even if Odex did not 
have legal standing to bring civil proceedings for copyright 
infringement, it is clear that their commercial interests in distributing 
licensed copies of the video titles in Singapore was at risk. Irrespective of 
whether they were exclusive licensees or just plain licensees, they had a 
genuine commercial interest in seeing the copyright in the anime titles 
enforced over and above the interest that any law abiding member of the 
public has in seeing laws properly enforced. Thus, even if as a matter of 
copyright law, they did not have title to sue, they were not idle “busy 
bodies” acting without any genuine economic grievance or interest at 
stake. 
17 What then was the role of Pacific Internet? Pacific Internet, were 
the internet service provider (“ISP”) who had “unwittingly” facilitated 
the file swapping and downloads by providing internet access to the 
users/subscribers concerned. The infringing users were essentially the 
customers of Pacific Internet for internet access services. Pacific Internet 
was under a contractual duty to keep the identity of its subscribers’ 
confidential (private) and they were also under a statutory duty to 
comply with the Telecommunications Act Code of Practice. This Code 
also requires confidentiality of end user subscriber information. 
18 What then was the order that Odex sought against Pacific 
Internet? Odex wanted discovery of the identity of the subscribers who 
had uploaded/downloaded the alleged infringing copies. Armed with 
that information, those subscribers could then be sued for copyright 
infringement and possibly, in some cases, prosecuted for the relevant 
copyright offences. Pacific Internet could provide the names but refused 
to do so, on account of the contractual confidentiality obligation and 
the statutory duty. 
B. The clash of rights 
19 Locus standi aside, Odex claimed the right to protect its 
commercial interests arising from or in connection with the copyright 
licence agreements. Whilst it accepted that Pacific Internet was not 
personally liable for the infringements committed by the 
uploaders/downloaders, they asserted that Pacific Internet should be 
                                                                                                                               
Primary Copyright Infringement in Singapore: Who are the Real Online Culprits” 
[2007] EIPR 108 and also “Defining Criminal Liability for Primary Acts of 
Copyright Infringement – The Singapore Experience” JBL 2008 4. Saw and Leong 
rightly point out the difficult question of construction that arises under s 136(3A) 
as to when infringement may be regarded as significant. This is an important issue 
which, whilst deserving of a full airing, will only be briefly touched on later in this 
article. 
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compelled to do the “right thing” by them and to identify the infringing 
subscribers. 
20 Pacific Internet, on the other hand, asserted their interest in 
avoiding potential liability to the subscribers for breach of contract 
(confidentiality) as well as to protect their licence as an ISP by 
complying with the Code of Practice. 
21 In this context, a clash arises: the IP interests and the interests of 
the subscribers to protect their identity (confidentiality/privacy) as well 
as the interest of Pacific Internet to protect their telecommunications 
licence as well as their commercial relationship with their customers. 
III. Fundamental rights and privacy interests: Some background 
documents 
22 Before delving into the legal issues (privacy, IPR, etc) that arose 
in the Odex litigation, a brief summary of some of the key international 
(and regional/domestic) documents in the area of privacy and basic 
rights may be helpful to set the scene for the discussion of balancing of 
rights. 
A. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (“UDHR”)8 
23 Several Articles are worth highlighting in the context of the 
above mentioned clash of rights. These are as follows. 
Article 12 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence or to attacks upon his honour or 
reputation. 
Article 17 
Everyone has the right to own property … no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his property. 
Article 18 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
Article 19 
                                                                       
8 See Thio Li-Ann, “Pragmatism and Realism Do not Mean Abdication. A Critical 
and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s Engagement with International Human 
Rights Law” (2004) 8 SYBIL 41. Professor Thio explains at p 50 that Singapore 
accepts the UDHR as a primary referent. Citing K Tan, “Fifty Years of UDHR: A 
Singapore Reflection” (1990) 20 Sing LR 265. See also Michael Hwang, “Think 
Public, Think International” Law Gazette, March 2008 that Singapore subscribes to 
the UDHR. 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression… to 
seek, receive and impart information. 
Article 29 
Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full 
development of his personality is possible. 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and general welfare in a democratic society. 
[emphasis added] 
24 Even a cursory glance at these provisions reveals a very carefully 
crafted balance indeed! Whilst interferences with rights/freedoms must 
not be arbitrary, clearly the UDHR accepts that on occasion 
interferences with even basic rights must be allowed. After all, important 
though we all are as individuals, we all have duties to the community as 
a whole and must find expression of our own personality through or as 
part of the wider community: by paying due respect to rights and 
freedoms of others. 
25 Odex might well pray in aid Art 17 of the UDHR. Pacific 
Internet and the user/subscriber on the other hand will pray in aid 
Art 12. Both will assert Art 29 and demand due recognition and 
respect!9 
B. The European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (“ECHR”) 
26 Whilst the ECHR is not applicable to Singapore, it may be 
worth mentioning that if it were a number of Articles would bear 
repeating in the context of the Odex dispute. 
Article 8 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
                                                                       
9 Pray in aid in the loose sense of referring to the rationale behind the provision to 
support their case. 
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Article 10 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority and 
regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties 
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
27 Thus, if legislation based on the principles of ECHR were 
enacted in Singapore: it is to be noted that the same proportional 
balanced response will be required as in the case of the UDHR. On this 
basis, Odex might point to Arts 8(2) and 10(2) whilst Pacific Internet 
and its subscribers would underscore Art 8(1). 
C. Singapore provisions on telecommunication user privacy and 
data protection 
28 Pursuant to s 26(1)(a) to (e) and (g) of the Telecommunications 
Act,10 the Info-communications Development Authority of Singapore 
has issued a Code of Practice which provides (amongst other things): 
3.2.6 Duty to Prevent Unauthorized Use of End User Service 
Information 
Licensees must take reasonable measures to prevent the unauthorized 
use of End User Service Information (EUSI) 
3.2.6.2 Prohibition on Unauthorized Use 
A licensee must … not use EUSI for any purpose other than … 
providing assistance to law enforcement, judicial or other government 
agencies.11 
29 Once again, we see the delicate balancing of rights and 
obligations. Odex will claim in aid of release of EUSI data for the 
purpose of providing assistance to judicial authorities in the sense of 
                                                                       
10 (Cap 323, 2000 Rev Ed). 
11 Query whether it will be helpful to expressly clarify that this proviso includes 
revelation of subscriber identity where there is a credible allegation of copyright 
infringement? 
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enabling legal proceedings to be brought before the court. Pacific 
Internet and its subscribers on the other hand pray in aid of the 
prohibition against unauthorised use. 
D. National Internet Advisory Committee (“NIAC”) 
30 In 2001, the NIAC issued its report on a Model Data Protection 
Code for the Private Sector. Whilst some countries have already 
introduced new statutory regulation of data collections comprising 
personally identifiable information, Singapore has elected to proceed 
down the path (as an interim measure) of voluntary data protection 
(self-regulation). In opting for this as an interim measure, it is worth 
stressing that the Committee did accept that effective protection of 
personal data is desirable in the Singapore private sector. That said, the 
need for a balanced approach was clearly recognised by the Committee 
in its support for exemptions where the processing of personal data is 
necessary to safeguard national security, defence, public security, 
prevention, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of 
breaches of ethics for regulated professions, etc, including the protection 
of the data subject or the rights and freedoms of others.12 
IV. Internet: Copying anonymity: The dilemma of  
copyright owners 
31 Whilst IPR are very important for the business/commercial 
community, they are not sacrosanct property rights that demand 
unqualified protection without exception or limits. Not only are there 
permissible limitations and exceptions built into each IPR (such as fair 
dealing defence and copyright), it is worth pointing out that the now 
venerable TRIPS Accord expressly recognises that IPR must take their 
place alongside other community interests and needs. Thus, Art 7 states: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations. 
32 One of the most pressing challenges to the IPRsystem of late has 
been the exponential growth of “home” or “domestic” piracy of 
copyright subject-matter. Gone are the days when only sophisticated 
commercial copyists had access to technology capable of making quick 
accurate multiple copies of copyright subject matter. The electronics 
                                                                       
12 A brief summary of data protection legislation is set out towards the end of this 
article. 
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and computer revolution of the past 50 years has now spawned what is 
sometimes called “the mother of all copying technologies”: the Internet 
and associated computer peripherals and P2P type software programs. 
Home copyists linked to the Internet are here, there and everywhere. 
Individually, home copyists may make very few infringing copies of any 
given work: collectively, the volume may well be massive. As 
commentators have said: 
[I]n light of the rapid advancements in computer, digital and Internet 
technologies, consumers and other end-users have begun to take 
things into their own hands. Instead of purchasing illegitimate copies 
of copyright material from the street vendor, they now discover that it 
is far more efficient and cost-effective to acquire digital copies for 
themselves in the privacy of their own rooms from certain Internet 
websites or through peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks. They 
may further decide to share these digital copies with others in the 
Internet or P2P file-sharing community. In the process, however, they 
inadvertently expose themselves to civil action for having committed 
primary acts of copyright infringement, and, in Singapore at least, 
they may also face criminal prosecution if primary infringers like 
themselves are found guilty of wilful infringements of copyright.
13
 
33 Whilst not all copying of copyright subject matter for individual 
use is necessarily infringement, it can be assumed that a good deal, 
probably the greater bulk, will constitute copyright infringement under 
existing copyright law in Singapore as well as in most WTO Member 
States. In some cases, as noted by the commentators referred to above, it 
may even be that the individual copyist will be liable under criminal 
provisions. 
34 Copyright owners and their exclusive licensees have a statutory 
right to sue for copyright infringement to secure and protect their 
commercial interests. But, for this to be effective, they must first be able 
to identify the infringers and then subsequently to bring an action and 
obtain meaningful remedies. It has sometimes been said that home 
digital piracy is prevalent not just because it is “cheap and accurate” but 
also because the chances of detection are slim and the practical 
problems of enforcement severe. 
35 This is not a new problem. In 1977, the English Whitford 
Committee (on copyright law reform) commented that the then new 
“hi-tech” nemesis of copyright, the now humble photocopying machine, 
had led to an explosion of illicit copying of printed material. Detection 
was said to be virtually impossible and that unless something was done 
                                                                       
13 Saw Cheng Lim & Susanna Leong, “Criminalising Copyright Infringement in 
Singapore: Who are the Real Online Culprits” [2007] EIPR 108. 
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soon, there was a serious danger that in some fields, publication would 
cease. 
36 Ten years later in 1988, the UK House of Lords had to deal with 
the impact of cheap easy to use cassette tape recorders on the sound 
recording and music industry. Imagine the collective shudder and groan 
reverberating through the music industry when the twin/quad-deck 
high speed stereo cassette tape copier was introduced. Lord Templeman 
remarked that: 
[F]rom the point of view of society, the … position is lamentable. 
Millions of breaches of the law must be committed by home copiers 
every year … Whatever the reason for home copying, the beat of 
Sergeant Pepper … from unlawful copies, are more powerful than law 
abiding instincts or twinges of conscience. A law which is treated with 
such contempt should be amended or repealed.
14
 
37 But, on the other hand, the closing decade of the last 
millennium has also seen the rise of groups advocating less rather than 
more copyright protection: these range from “copyleft” groups to “open 
source software” advocates to supporters of the “creative commons” to 
groups who simply argue for the legalisation of all copying for 
private/personal use. 
38 This is not the time or place to address the merits or otherwise 
of arguments to the effect that the answer to mushrooming illicit 
copying in the Internet is to simply make much of the copying lawful. 
39 The reality is that the world trade community has responded 
over the past 15 years with a deliberate strengthening of the rights of 
IPR owners in general and copyright owners in particular. One thinks, 
for example, of the extension of the copyright term to life plus 70 years, 
new enhanced criminal provisions as well as new legal measures 
designed to protect copy lock protection and electronic rights 
management. 
40 There are of course those who strongly argue that the 
pendulum has now swung far too much in favour of IPR owners and 
that the carefully crafted minimum standards required in international 
agreements such as TRIPS have been steadily “ratcheted” up on the back 
of bi-lateral free trade agreements. 
41 Whatever view one takes of these comments, enthusiastic 
support, ambivalence or disagreement, the impact of the Internet on the 
commercial interests of copyright owners is obvious and the danger to 
their commercial interests clear and present. 
                                                                       
14 CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] 2 All ER 484. 
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42 If copyright is emasculated by copying technology and the 
Internet, copyright industries will have no choice but to try and develop 
other business models which permit free personal use/access and which 
still enable them to turn their copyright into performing assets. Whether 
this can be done, remains to be seen. What is clear is that as the law 
currently stands in Singapore, there is little doubt that many of the 
individuals who download copyright material such as films, sound 
recordings or music through the P2P system are committing copyright 
infringement. Resort to fair dealing defence will require very careful 
study and investigation of the facts and is likely to be difficult in most 
cases. In many of these cases, it is also probable that the ISPs will have 
access to the necessary information to identify the individuals 
concerned. The copyright owners and their licensees, on the other hand, 
will not have access to this information. 
43 Whether or not the ISPs are personally liable for the 
infringement by the subscribers and even if they bear no legal 
responsibility at all for the acts of their subscribers, the ISPs at the very 
least will have “facilitated” the infringing acts by providing the internet 
access service which enabled the infringement. Is this enough to 
generate a duty to assist the victims of the wrongdoing? 
V. The US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (“FTA”): Subscriber 
anonymity and copyright 
44 Given the problems highlighted above, it should come as no 
surprise to find that the US-Singapore FTA attempts to deal with the 
problems faced by many copyright owners in identifying infringing 
internet users. Article 16.9.22(b) provides that: 
Each Party shall establish an administrative or judicial procedure 
enabling copyright owners … to obtain expeditiously from a service 
provider, information in its possession identifying the alleged 
infringer. 
45 The intent and spirit of this provision is clear. ISPs in Singapore 
must lift the veil and provide information identifying alleged copyright 
infringers. 
46 Is this consistent with international norms safeguarding 
individual rights of privacy and/or confidentiality? Clearly the answer 
must be an unqualified yes! 
47 Article 17 of the UDHR recognises the right to own property: 
that an individual should not arbitrarily be denied his property. 
Copyright is a species of property. And whilst Art 17 may be more 
concerned with unilateral compulsory acquisition by the State, the 
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provision does underscore the importance of upholding property 
interests. 
48 Whilst Art 12 of the UDHR does underscore privacy as a 
human right, this is subject to Art 29 which provides that an individual 
also owes duties to the community at large and that he is to respect the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
49 Article 8(2) of the ECHR similarly recognises that whilst there 
shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of the 
right of privacy, that this is except such as is “in accordance with the law 
and is necessary … for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others”. 
50 Similarly, The Code of Practice for Competition in the 
Provision of Telecommunication Service 2005 as well as the NIAC 
Model Data Protection Code for the Private Sector supports the view 
that personal information may sometimes be justifiably released to 
relevant parties in order to provide assistance to judicial agencies or to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
51 What then of the common law (and equity) in general in 
Singapore (and elsewhere)? What has been the response of the Judiciary 
to the need for a balance of rights and freedoms in the context of the 
privacy debate? The short answer must be that the need for a balancing 
of rights and freedoms for the greater good of society as a whole 
permeates much of the common law and rules of equity. 
52 A few examples suffice to illustrate the point. At a very early 
stage, the common law recognised the right of an individual to protect 
his bodily integrity: that he/she should enjoy physical self-autonomy. 
Hence, the early development of the tort of trespass to the person: 
battery and assault. Then there was the expansion of trespass to cover 
false imprisonment as well as intentional/reckless infliction of 
psychiatric harm. As is well known, battery comprises the intentional 
and direct application of force to the body of another person. An 
unwanted kiss on the cheek is as much battery (as well as invasion of 
privacy) as a punch to the face. An individual’s right to protect his body 
(to be let alone) is perhaps the most basic and fundamental of the rights 
that he may enjoy under the law. But even here, the tort of battery must 
take account of wider social interests. 
53 Ordinary social intercourse and interaction, especially in an 
ever more crowded world, necessarily involves some direct intentional 
physical contact. Imagine trying to take a bus home at rush hour in a 
crowded city without having to “push” past another passenger. In some 
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cases, to avoid all physical contact one may have to be a contortionist or 
perhaps wait for the next and hopefully less crowded bus. Is it any 
wonder that the law15 recognises that intentional bodily contact is not 
battery if that type of contact was generally acceptable in everyday life? 
Life in any community and especially a densely populated city 
necessarily demands that individual members accept some degree of 
physical contact that is incidental and a routine part of day-to-day life. A 
balance is achieved within the generally accepted practices of the 
community in question.16 
54 Second, even in the case of property interests, whilst the owner 
will enjoy a powerful right of self-determination in respect of the 
property and a right to exclude all others, the right is not absolute or 
unqualified. Take for example that most pervasive of IPR, copyright. 
Copyright provides a deep and broad right to prevent the making of 
unauthorised copies of the protected work. But, in some countries, aside 
from statutory exceptions such as fair dealing or fair use or use in 
judicial proceedings, a broad based public interest defence may exist to 
justify the making of copies when necessary to protect some other 
public interest (such as crime investigation).17 
55 If copying and dissemination in the name of the public interest 
can sometimes (if not a little controversially) justify copyright 
infringement, it should come as no surprise to find that the most 
important qualification to a person’s right to protect his confidential 
information (including trade secrets and sensitive commercial 
information) is also to be found in the public interest defence. 
56 Much has been written on this defence in actions for breach of 
confidence. It is enough to remind ourselves that from its humble start 
as a rule founded on public policy and a refusal to protect (or grant 
relief to) information regarding serious crimes, misdeeds and iniquities, 
the defence has developed into a free ranging inquiry that seeks to 
balance the public interest in preserving the confidence against any 
public interest that is asserted as providing just cause for breaking the 
confidence. Public interest is not just an exercise of discretion to refuse 
grant of relief; it now operates as a true defence to liability. In its 
modern free ranging form, the defence has become a powerful tool 
                                                                       
15 See Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1 WLR 1172. See also Wilson v Pringle [1987] QB 237. 
16 But note that the courts in Singapore generally take the view that Singapore is still a 
conservative society and that unwanted contact, even slight contact, especially 
between males and females, may well be unacceptable. See Soh Yang Tick v PP 
[1998] 2 SLR 42 at [80] per Yong Pung How CJ in connection with a prosecution 
under s 354 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) (outraging modesty). 
17 See Saw Cheng Lim, “Is There a Defence of Public Interest in the Law of Copyright 
in Singapore?” (2003) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies at pp 519–556. 
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aiding freedom of information type arguments under the banner of 
public interest. 
57 Whilst the goal of protecting the sanctity of any confidential 
relationship clearly falls within the public interest, arguably the most 
important confidential relationship is the one which exists between a 
doctor and his/her patient. And yet, even here, courts in England and 
elsewhere have allowed disclosures of medical records where necessary 
to safeguard some competing public interest. Thus, disclosure of an 
adverse confidential psychiatric report to the relevant authorities (to the 
effect that the patient was still a danger to the public) was justified even 
though it was accepted that doctor/patient confidentiality was a very 
important facet of the public interest.18 
58 In yet another case, what was in issue was the identity of doctors 
who had contracted HIV and who were still practising medicine under 
the NHS. Whilst, the public interest defence failed, the point to be made 
is that the court was deeply concerned to balance the public interest in a 
free press and an informed public debate (about spread of HIV within 
society including the medical profession) against the public interest in 
that AIDS sufferers should be able to resort to medical treatment 
without fear of his/her identity being revealed. On the facts of that case, 
the balance came down in favour of maintaining confidentiality.19 This 
decision might be contrasted with cases where there is a need to 
publicise the identity of a patient (possibly in national media) in an 
attempt to control the spread of a vicious highly infectious virus 
through aggressive contact tracing.20 
59 In more recent times, the identity of a famous well-known 
fashion model undergoing treatment for addiction to narcotics was 
justified in the name of the public interest. But, by the narrowest of 
margins, the House of Lords also held that the newspaper went too far 
when details of that treatment were also disclosed.21 What was the 
balancing public interest in issue in this case? It was the need to correct 
the false public impression (created by the plaintiff) that she was not 
involved with drugs. In short, the English courts appear to accept that 
with the deepening and expanding protection offered by the law of 
confidence to private personal information that a more robust 
recognition of competing public interests, including the need to correct 
a false role model image, had to be developed.22 This did not mean that 
                                                                       
18 W v Egdell [1989] 2 WLR 689, [1990] Ch 1. 
19 X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648. 
20 Recall the SARS epidemic in Singapore and the need for urgent public contact 
tracing. 
21 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 WLR 1232. 
22 In the UK, the Human Rights Act 1998 brings into UK domestic law, the 
provisions of the ECHR 1950. To ensure adequate protection of the Art 8 right of 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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the plaintiff ’s privacy interest was ignored. The House of Lords took 
pains to stress the importance of confidentiality of medical information 
of patients. Given the public interest in seeing the plaintiff complete her 
drug rehabilitation treatment at her chosen clinic, the majority of the 
House came to the view that disclosure of the details of her treatment 
(and photograph of her leaving the clinic) was excessive and outside of 
the public interest in correcting the false impression. 
60 There is in fact nothing new in this “scales of balance” approach. 
Of course, opinions can differ on where the balance lies in any given 
case. As long ago as 1977, Lord Denning MR, in permitting disclosure of 
personal information which showed certain famous pop stars in a bad 
light, remarked: if a group seek publicity which is to their advantage, 
they cannot complain if a servant chooses to tell the truth. If the image 
which they fostered is not a true image, it is in the public interest that it 
be corrected. Just as there should be truth in advertising, so there should 
be truth in publicity. The public must not be misled!23 Since then the 
courts in England have had to grapple with a diverse range of cases 
where confidentiality/privacy interests have come up against various 
competing public interest issues (from role model arguments to abuse 
of position) including extra marital affairs and football stars,24 visits to a 
prostitute and a well-known broadcast personality25 and information 
about possible misuse by a CEO of a public listed company of corporate 
facilities for the benefit of his companion.26 
                                                                                                                               
privacy, the English courts have taken the view that the better approach is to 
expand the protection afforded by the law of confidence. That said, it is important 
to note that the law of confidence from its earliest days was always capable of 
protecting confidential personal information as well as trade and business secrets. 
What has happened in the UK is that with the Human Rights Act 1998, the English 
courts have felt obliged to comply with Art 8 by broadening the protection by 
recognising that the action can protect any personal information which a 
reasonable person would regard as private. See Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 WLR 
1232 and Murray v Express Newspapers and Big Pictures Ltd [2007] EWHC 1908 
and on appeal at [2008] EWCA Civ 446.That being so, free speech advocates assert 
that it will be even more important now to balance that right against public 
interests that may support disclosure. 
23 Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 1 WLR 760, [1977] 2 All ER 751. Perhaps this case 
represents an extreme application of the public interest defence? There are those 
who would argue that the balance should have come down in favour of the 
plaintiffs. In a different context, Wright J (Supreme Court Tasmania) once stated 
in connection with a claim for invasion of privacy and press freedom that he “had a 
healthy scepticism about the application of such glib clichés as freedom of speech 
which are so often relied on to justify the dissemination of material which powerful 
controllers of the mass media choose to place before the public”. See Lenah Game 
Meats Pty Ltd v ABC [1999] TASSC 114 at para 18. 
24 A v B [2002] 1 All ER 449. 
25 Theakston v MGN [2002] EMLR 22. See also Max Mosley v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777. 
26 Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers [2007] 3 WLR 289. 
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VI. The need for checks and balances: Proportionality, legal 
principles and the pursuit of justice 
61 The pursuit of truth and justice is not limited to the substantive 
rules (laws) which govern individual behaviour in society, Of course, 
rights and freedoms, especially fundamental rights and freedoms, are 
important in establishing the framework and structure of the house of 
justice. Equally important is access to the state agencies so that disputes 
can be adjudicated, complaints investigated and the rights and freedoms 
developed, explained, qualified and, of course, enforced. 
62 Inefficient, ineffective or unnecessarily cumbersome judicial 
procedures may be just as bad, or even worse, than systems where no 
rights are granted in the first place. In the realm of IP law, this has long 
been a problem – one that has been greatly exacerbated by the explosion 
of digital copying facilitated by the computer and the Internet. This has 
been alluded to already in this article. 
63 Professor David Vaver, in his typically witty paper, Intellectual 
Property: The State of the Art, identifies this problem as “the intellectual 
crisis of intellectual property”. The clarion call of supporters of free 
internet and file swapping programs is that information and knowledge 
wants to be free and that any attempt by copyright holders to halt the 
free movement of digital data are doomed to fail. Professor Vaver 
continues: 
Digital technology is just the latest manifestation of intellectual 
property’s continual crises. While business and governments have put 
much effort in trying to strengthen the copyright system – tightening 
copyright owner’s control over electronic activity, adapting copyright 
rules to achieve that goal, and shrinking the scope of the public 
domain – the technology itself has questioned the practicality of these 
endeavors … But as existing works are digitized, with or without 
authorization, or new works are made available solely in digital 
format, copyright becomes less able to cope with the manipulation 
and movement of intangible electronic streams. Detection and 
enforcement become difficult, sometimes impossible … In this world, 
every user is a potential re-author and re-distributor of material made 
available electronically to her. In this world, the only way in which an 
initial provider of a work or information can practically profit from its 
investment may be through reliance on shared ethical understandings, 
encryption and password technology, click-on contracts and good 
marketing …27 
64 These remarks give all IP lawyers and users of IP subject matter 
much to think about. What is the long-term solution to the apparent 
                                                                       
27 LQR 2000 116 (October) 621. 
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mismatch between the needs of copyright owners and the wants of 
individual users of the Internet? Can copyright holders find new 
(profitable) ways of exploiting (marketing) the material so as to provide 
for free (or cheap and convenient) personal use on the Internet? In the 
case of music, should the industry move to a platform or business 
model where distribution on the Internet is regarded as advertising and 
branding: the more distribution the better? After all, with popularity 
comes the prospect of lucrative live tours, film synchronisation rights 
and so forth. Is there a realistic marketing model which will enable 
creators of commercial copyright material to earn a satisfactory 
remuneration and which still meets the public “hunger” for free (cheap 
and convenient) access for private enjoyment on the Internet? If movies 
and films are seen as an attractive vehicle whereby internet popularity of 
a literary or musical work can be turned into account, will this still hold 
true if those movies and films are in turn copied and distributed for free 
on the Internet? Will screenings in cinemas be enough given the huge 
costs of movie production? 
65 Whatever view is taken on the marketing response that the 
copyright industry should take to the Internet, the question remains as 
to how their present rights are to be enforced. As Lord Templeman 
states: a law which is ignored with abandon and treated with contempt 
should either be amended or repealed! 
66 Repealing the law against digital copying (even if limited to 
digital copying for personal use) will require a major shift in the 
thinking underlying TRIPS, WCT and WPPT treaties28 and will also 
require a rethink of the terms of the US-Singapore FTA! 
67 Quite a daunting proposition! But, that is not to say that the 
time has not come for such a rethink by the international community as 
a whole. Indeed, as mentioned already, there is a building body of 
opinion that the problem with IPR as a whole and copyright in 
particular is that the law has become, especially since 1995, overly pre-
occupied with rights and with only lip service being paid to the question 
of matching responsibilities. 
68 Has the time come when responsibilities and duties of IPR 
owners need to be re-examined and underscored if broader societal 
acceptance of IP is to be achieved in this new information age? Maybe 
so, but, in the meantime, life must go on in accordance with the current 
balance as set out in the existing laws. TRIPS and the US/Singapore FTA 
require not only that the rights be granted but that there should be 
                                                                       
28 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 
(“TRIPS”); WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 (“WCT”) and WIPO Performances and 
Phonogram Treaty 1996 (“WPPT”). 
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expeditious means made available for enforcement. Thus, Art 41 of 
TRIPS requires Members to ensure that enforcement procedures are 
available so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement 
including expeditious remedies to prevent and deter infringements. 
69 Similarly, Para 16.9.7 of the US-Singapore FTA requires that 
each Party make available to right holders (including exclusive licensees) 
civil judicial procedures concerning enforcement of any IPR. Further, 
Para 16.9.22(a) goes on to state that each Party shall provide legal 
incentives for service providers to co-operate with copyright owners in 
deterring the unauthorised storage and transmission of copyrighted 
materials. 
70 Article 16.9.22(b), quoted already, then goes on to provide that 
each Party “shall establish an administrative or judicial procedure 
enabling copyright owners … to obtain expeditiously from a service 
provider, information in its possession identifying the alleged infringer”. 
71 In Singapore, there are in fact two well-established procedures 
relevant to discovery of identity of subscribers from ISPs. These are 
dealt with below. 
VII. Equitable discovery: Norwich Pharmacal orders 
72 Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commr29 (“Norwich 
Pharmacal”) concerned an age-old problem: identifying the individual 
responsible for infringing a person’s rights so that a claim can be 
brought before the courts. There is little point in knowing that the law 
has created substantive rights that can be asserted to protect legally 
recognised interests if the would be claimant is unable to identify or find 
the wrongdoer. 
73 The same problem arises in criminal law. It is usually obvious 
that a crime has been committed. The identity of the victim seldom 
creates any difficulty. But the answer to the question, who then is the 
perpetrator, is often far more problematic. A horse is stolen, but by 
whom? If the wrongdoer is identified, the victim (owner of the horse) 
may be able to sue in the courts for its return or compensation and the 
public prosecutor will be able to indict the wrongdoer for theft. The 
victim’s civil rights are enforced by the civil courts whilst society’s 
interest in law and order is safeguarded by the prosecution in the 
criminal courts. 
                                                                       
29 [1974] AC 133, [1973] 3 WLR 164. 
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74 Suppose that there is a witness to the commission of the 
wrongful act: can the witness be compelled to reveal the identity of the 
wrongdoer to the victim and/or the authorities so that appropriate civil 
and/or criminal proceedings can be instituted? 
75 This is a very old problem that involves balancing competing 
interests and rights. The witness is not personally liable or responsible 
for the commission of the wrongdoing and whilst he could help the 
victim, he asserts his right to be left alone. Beyond wanting to be left 
alone, the witness may even assert that he is in a confidential 
relationship with the wrongdoer and that the revelation of the 
wrongdoer’s identity may expose him to some legal liability. The victim, 
on the other hand, pleads his plight: a wrong has been committed and if 
the witness does not assist, that wrong will go unremedied and/or 
unpunished. Surely the witness as a fellow member and beneficiary of 
the society in which they both live owes a duty to that society and its 
members to assist – or so the victim may argue. But, just as the common 
law recognises that a bystander cannot (generally) be compelled to assist 
a person in trouble (drowning in a swimming pool is a common 
example), so too it does not generally compel a mere witness to assist a 
victim by revealing the name of the wrongdoer. As one commentator 
has said in the context of developing a philosophy for the law of 
evidence, the trial process is not simply about finding the truth in order 
to do justice, the fundamental concern should be to do justice in the 
search for truth!30 
76 Where a person is a mere witness, the balance has come down 
in favour of the witness.31 Whether or not there are good arguments to 
change the balance and order disclosure (either in general or in certain 
areas) against a mere witness, the position is different where the witness 
has facilitated the commission of the wrongdoing. Even if that 
individual is not personally liable for the wrongdoing (as where he 
innocently lends a kitchen knife to the assailant), does the fact that he 
has unwittingly facilitated the wrongdoing mean that he should be 
under some legal duty to assist the victim by revealing the identity of the 
                                                                       
30 Ho Hock Lai, A Philosophy of Evidence Law, Justice in the Search for Truth (OUP, 
2008). 
31 Note s 121(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) provides that 
a police officer making a police investigation under this Chapter may examine 
orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of 
the case and shall reduce into writing any statement made by the person so 
examined. Subsection (2) also states that such a person shall be bound to state truly 
the facts and circumstances with which he is acquainted concerning the case except 
only that he may decline to make with regard to any fact or circumstance a 
statement which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a 
penalty or forfeiture. The author is grateful to Professor Ho (n 30) for drawing his 
attention to this provision. 
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wrongdoer? Does this depend on the degree to which the witness has in 
fact facilitated the commission of the wrongdoing and/or whether the 
victim has any other reasonable means of identifying the wrongdoer? If 
so, what if the individual has provided the “essential” means by which 
the wrongdoing was committed in circumstances such that it would be 
difficult (or much more difficult) for the wrongdoer to commit the 
wrongdoing if the witness had not been so involved: is there a case for 
saying that in such circumstances, the law should place an affirmative 
duty on the facilitator to assist the victim by doing the right thing? The 
assertion that he should assist arises not so much because he has 
witnessed a wrongdoing but because he has unwittingly facilitated its 
commission in circumstances such that the victim has no other 
reasonable means of discovering the identity of the wrongdoer. 
77 In the area of IPR, the owners of the rights have long 
complained of the practical problems that they encounter in enforcing 
their rights. In some cases, the evidence is destroyed or assets against 
which any judgment may be executed transferred, hidden or otherwise 
disposed of in an attempt to make the defendant “judgment proof”. In 
other cases, the real perpetrator or “master mind” may be hidden behind 
many layers of “paper” companies and other individuals who are willing 
to “take the rap” for the infringements. These are well-known problems 
that have been around for quite some time.32 
78 Then there is the question of the innocent facilitator who knows 
the identity of the infringer but who is unwilling or is reluctant to come 
forth. How this last problem is best dealt with is the question of law and 
policy that lies at the heart of the Norwich Pharmacal principle and the 
decision in the Odex case. But, before the rule in Norwich Pharmacal is 
summarised, it may be interesting to query what alternatives a law 
maker might have when faced with the quandary described above in the 
context of copyright infringement. 
                                                                       
32 It should come as no surprise to find that some of the most innovative 
developments in procedural law have arisen out of intellectual property litigation. 
These include the now well established (but initially highly controversial) Anton 
Piller order dealing with ex parte applications to preserve evidence. See Anton Piller 
KG v Mfg Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55. This case concerned copyright infringement 
and breach of confidence. Similarly, Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise 
Commr [1974] AC 133, [1973] 3 WLR 164 is a case concerning patent 
infringement. Mention should be made of another powerful procedural 
development (with the modern form developing in the 1970s): the Mareva 
injunction. Whilst many of the early Mareva cases involved Admiralty/shipping 
disputes, there is no doubt that the Mareva injunction is also available in suitable 
cases concerning IPR. The Mareva is essentially concerned with pre-trial protection 
of assets. See Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA [1975] 2 
Lloyds Rep 509. 
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79 The first will be to do nothing, which may well mean that the 
victim is unable to enforce his rights as he cannot identify the 
wrongdoer. 
80 The second will be to re-examine whether the victim should 
have been granted the rights in the first place. If these rights are 
infringed with great abandon and in circumstances whereby it is very 
hard for the victim to enforce his rights, is there a case for saying that 
perhaps it would be better to remove the right, for example, by legalising 
all private, non-commercial copying of copyright material? 
81 The third option may be to expand the rights of the victim by 
creating a cause of action against the person who facilitated the 
commission of the wrongdoing. For example, there is the possibility that 
the facilitator may be liable with the actual wrongdoer on the basis of 
joint tortfeasorship: participation in a common design and so forth. In 
other cases, it may be that the statute creating the right provides that a 
person who authorises another to commit infringement is liable 
together with the person who actually commits the infringement. In 
such cases, it will not be surprising if copyright owners try to cast 
liability on the shoulders of he or she who facilitates by arguing for an 
expansion of joint tortfeasorship principles or by arguing that the 
facilitator has impliedly authorised the infringement. However, these 
attempts have rarely succeeded.33 
82 The fourth option will be to try and persuade the legislators to 
introduce legislative controls over the technology or “the means” that 
the facilitator makes available to the actual infringer; for example, by 
making ISPs liable for infringement committed through use of their 
services if they continue to allow the infringer access to those services 
after the ISP is notified of the infringement.34 This may also be 
combined with attempts to use technology to make copying more 
difficult, such as through the use of encryption and other forms of copy 
prevention technology including electronic rights management 
information.35 
                                                                       
33 See CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics plc [1988] 2 All ER 484 where 
the copyright owner tried unsuccessfully to argue that a manufacturer of a twin 
deck cassette tape machine was liable for authorising infringement or under joint 
tortfeasorship principles. In Singapore, see also Ong Seow Pheng v Lotus 
Development Corp [1997] 3 SLR 137. These cases demonstrate just how difficult it 
is to establish liability under either authorisation or joint tortfeasorship against a 
person who merely facilitates the commission of a wrongdoing. 
34 In Singapore, see Pt IXA of the Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed) which sets out 
special provisions on the liability and protection of network service providers. 
35 In Singapore, see Pts XIII and XIIIA of the Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed) 
on rights management information and circumvention of technological measures. 
614 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2008) 20 SAcLJ 
 
83 The fifth option which may well be combined with the fourth 
option will be to develop legal principles which enable the victim to 
compel the innocent facilitator to come to his/her assistance by 
revealing the identity of the wrongdoer. Perhaps as a quid pro quo for 
not extending the substantive liability driven principles of joint 
tortfeasorship, infringing authorisation and vicarious liability, innocent 
facilitators should accept an obligation to reveal the identity of the 
wrongdoer. This can be achieved either by means of judicial 
development of some common law or equitable rule (as in the Norwich 
Pharmacal case) or by means of statutory provisions. 
A. The Norwich Pharmacal order 
84 The Norwich Pharmacal case concerned an owner (patentee) of 
the patent rights in a chemical compound. One of the exclusive rights 
that they enjoyed under the English Patents Act was the right to import 
copies of the chemical compound into the UK. Unknown persons had 
been importing quantities into the UK without the licence of the 
patentee. If they could be identified, actions for patent infringement 
could be brought. This, however, was a problem as the patentee did not 
know the identities of the importers. But since custom duties had been 
paid on the imports, it followed that the Customs and Excise Office 
possessed information from which the importers could be identified. 
On these facts, there was no question of the Customs and Excise 
Commissioners being personally liable for the infringing importations. 
At best, they had innocently facilitated the commission of the 
wrongdoing (importation) by processing the shipments. Were they now 
under a duty to disclose the identity of the importers to the patentee? 
85 The House of Lords (unanimous) were of the view that the 
innocent facilitator should be under a duty in equity to reveal the 
identity of the importers.36 Lord Reid explained that whilst discovery as 
a remedy in equity had a long history and was primarily used to assist a 
party to existing litigation, that this jurisdiction included discovery for 
the purpose of identifying other defendants who might be joined in. 
86 Did this mean (applying the mere witness rule) that discovery 
should be limited to persons against whom the plaintiff enjoyed a 
substantive cause of action? Lord Reid noted that the point behind the 
rule that discovery should not be granted against a “mere witness” was 
the assumption that the testimony of that witness would in due course 
be presented at trial. May be so, but this creates an obvious problem 
where the witness is the only person who can identify the wrongdoer for 
                                                                       
36 Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commr [1974] AC 133, [1973] 3 WLR 
164. 
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the plaintiff to sue! Even so, Lord Reid accepted that it would not be 
proper, either as a matter of authority, principle or public policy, to 
order discovery against a mere witness so that the person who suffered 
damage might be able to find and sue the wrongdoer. 
87 However, the position was different where, but for the action 
taken by the innocent defendants, “the infringements could never have 
been committed.” Lord Reid explained that in such cases it was a very 
reasonable principle that: 
[I]f through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious 
acts of others so as to facilitate their wrong doing he may incur no 
personal liability but he comes under a duty to assist the person who 
has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the 
identity of the wrongdoers …
37
 
88 On the facts, Lord Reid was satisfied that the defendants should 
be required to reveal the information “unless there was some 
consideration of public policy” that prevents disclosure. In deciding this, 
Lord Reid held that it was necessary to “weigh the requirements of 
justice” to the victim against any considerations put forward by the 
defendant. An argument that the disclosure might hamper the efficient 
conduct of the defendant’s statutory duties was not accepted. Neither 
did Lord Reid accept that disclosure should be refused on account of the 
prejudice that it may cause to those whose identity would be disclosed. 
To this Lord Reid commented, if we could be sure “that those whose 
names are sought are all tortfeasors, they do not deserve to be 
protected”.38 
89 Lord Morris whilst expressing similar views noted that the 
Commissioners had acted properly in declining to voluntarily give the 
names of the importers. After all, the information was confidential and 
acquired by the Commissioners under statutory compulsion for limited 
purposes. Whilst there is an obvious public interest in safeguarding 
confidentiality obligations, it is well established that any duty of 
confidentiality must be balanced against any public interest in favour of 
disclosure. Since Lord Morris agreed with the disclosure of the names of 
the importers, it follows that Lord Morris accepted that the public 
interest justified any breach of confidentiality that might arise from the 
release of the names. 
                                                                       
37 [1974] AC 133 at 175. 
38 [1974] AC 133 at 176. More difficult would be a case where there was a reasonable 
possibility that the persons whose names were sought were not in fact tortfeasors. 
In such cases, Lord Reid stated that the court should only order discovery if 
satisfied that there is no substantial chance of injustice being done. On the facts, 
the possibility that the persons whose names were sought were not tortfeasors was 
so remote that it could be ignored. 
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90 The issue of confidentiality was also addressed by Viscount 
Dilhorne. The Court of Appeal had taken the view that the information 
was received in confidence and that the balance of the public interest 
demanded that the Commissioners keep the names and addresses of the 
importers a secret. Viscount Dilhorne agreed that discovery could be 
granted “against a person who is not a mere witness to discover the fact 
of some wrongdoing being established, who was responsible for it”. The 
mere witness rule did not apply to someone who was “involved in the 
transaction”. To this, Viscount Dilhorne added that it did not matter if 
that “someone” could have been sued by the plaintiff or whether the 
“involvement or participation was innocent and in ignorance of the 
wrongdoing”. Given that the Commissioners were involved in the 
wrongdoing of the importers, the court enjoyed the power to compel 
disclosure of the identity of the importers. The question then was 
whether, given the discretionary nature of the remedy, the court should 
decline to grant the relief on account of some counterbalancing public 
interest. On this balancing exercise, Viscount Dilhorne underscored the 
importance to the public interest of protecting the right of patent 
holders. Against this was the public interest in upholding duties of 
confidence. The Commissioners argued that the identity of the 
importers was confidential and that “exceptionally strong reasons must 
exist to permits its disclosure to” outside persons. 
91 An important point of proportionality arises in determining the 
balance of competing interests. The law of confidence covers an 
enormously diverse range of information: from information that is 
highly valuable, unique and secret to information which, whilst 
confidential, lies close to the public domain. Even where a piece of 
information is highly secret and known only to a few persons, it may 
possess relatively little value or importance. The same is true, if not 
more so, of private information. Much development has taken place in 
UK and Europe these past years to broaden protection for an 
individual’s right of “informational privacy”. The universe of private 
facts protected under an expanded law of confidence may be broad, but 
not all private facts are equal in terms of their sensitivity or importance. 
Medical information will almost always be near the top end of the scale. 
Information concerning a “routine” family shopping trip in a public 
shopping centre will likely come in lower down the scale. But even here, 
not necessarily always so, as much may depend on the circumstances.39 
Names and addresses may well be confidential or private information, 
but the importance of the identity from a privacy perspective will 
depend on the facts and the nature of the information in respect of 
which his/her identity has arisen. 
                                                                       
39 See, for example. Murray v Big Pictures Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446 (infant plaintiff 
who was the son of a famous parent photographed in a stroller in a public road 
with his parents). 
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92 Not only will there be varying degrees of confidentiality/privacy, 
it is important to bear in mind that there will be varying degrees of trust 
inherent in different types of relationships. The relationship between a 
doctor and his patient will be near the top end of the spectrum; indeed, 
in some countries, the doctor/patient relationship is said to be of a 
fiduciary nature. In other cases, there may be statutory obligations re-
enforcing equitable obligations of confidentiality and which may even 
expressly prohibit disclosure. 
93 On the facts of Norwich Pharmacal, Viscount Dilhorne, whilst 
accepting that some of the information which came into the hands of 
the Commissioners would be highly confidential, held that the 
information as to the identity of the importers attracted a low degree of 
confidentiality that was outweighed by the interests of justice – a factor 
that operated in the national interest.40 
B. Main conditions and scope of the modern Norwich Pharmacal 
order 
94 Since the original decision in 1973, a considerable body of case 
law has developed in England on the conditions and scope of the order. 
In brief, the main points are set out below. 
(a) The person against whom discovery is sought must 
have become mixed up with the wrongdoing of another: for 
example by facilitating the commission of the wrongdoing or by 
participation in that wrongdoing.41 
(b) It does not matter whether the facilitation or 
participation is done innocently and irrespective as to whether 
there is knowledge of the wrongdoing.42 
                                                                       
40 Similar points were made by Lord Cross and Lord Kilbrandon. Lord Cross noted 
that there was no statute that prohibited disclosure of the names by the 
Commissioners. Lord Cross also stresses that in exercising its discretion, the court 
should look at the strength of the applicant’s case against the unknown alleged 
wrongdoer, the relation between the alleged wrongdoer and the respondent, 
whether the information could be obtained from another source and the degree of 
inconvenience that the respondent would be put to if the order was made and 
whether this could be compensated by an award of costs/expenses. 
41 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29. Lord Slynn at para 1 
stated that the order “does not depend on whether the person against whom the 
order is sought has committed a tort, a breach of contract or other civil or criminal 
wrong. It is sufficient but, it is also important to stress, also necessary that that 
person should be shown to have participated or been involved in the wrongdoing 
…”. 
42 Questions must remain over the degree of participation/facilitation for the “mere 
witness” rule to be displaced. 
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(c) In most cases, the purpose of the order is to enable the 
applicant to commence civil proceedings against the wrongdoer. 
That said, the House of Lords in UK has since held that the 
jurisdiction is founded on enabling the applicant to obtain relief 
for the wrongdoing and that in some cases this may take the 
form of dismissal of the wrongdoer (for example under a 
contract of employment).43 
(d) The original decision concerned the identity of patent 
infringers (breach of statutory duty). In England, the order is 
now predicated on the notion of “wrongdoing” rather than 
“tortious” conduct. Wrongdoing includes all torts as well as 
breach of contract and equitable obligations of confidence. 
There is also support from the House of Lords for an extension 
of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction to include criminal 
offences (even if there is no parallel civil cause of action).44 Such 
an approach would be consistent with the shift in the centre of 
gravity of the jurisdiction away from a civil suit for a tort and to 
the broader concept of enabling the victim of a wrongdoing to 
seek a remedy in the law. 45 Remedy in this sense may include the 
initiation of criminal proceedings, possibly by way of a private 
prosecution. In the Ashworth case, Lord Woolf strongly 
supported extending Norwich Pharmacal to cover victims of a 
crime. With respect, his Lordship rightly concludes that if a 
victim of a wrongdoing is content that the wrongdoer be 
prosecuted by the appropriate prosecuting authority, there is no 
objection to his obtaining the identity to enable that to 
happen.46 If there was a danger that a claim to exercise a 
                                                                       
43 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29. See also Carlton Film 
Distributors Ltd v VDC Ltd [2003] EWHC 616 where the court ordered disclosure 
of information intended to assist the plaintiff formulate his claim. The equitable 
jurisdiction was described in terms of assistance in the attainment of justice. 
44 See Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29 and also David 
Edward Hughes v Carratu International Plc [2006] EWHC 1791. 
45 See Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29. Lord Woolf at 
para 45 cited with approval the views of Lord Denning in British Steel Corp v 
Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096 that there was no ground to limit the order 
to cases where the injured person wanted to sue the wrongdoer. The order could be 
made to enable him to obtain redress or to protect himself against further 
wrongdoing. Similarly, Templeman LJ (as he then was) stated that: “The remedy of 
discovery is intended in the final analysis to enable justice to be done. Justice can be 
achieved against an erring employee is a variety of ways and a plaintiff may obtain 
an order of discovery provided he shows that he is genuinely seeking lawful redress 
of a wrong and cannot otherwise obtain redress …” But see also for a contrary 
view, Sedley LJ in Interbrew SA v Financial Times Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 274. 
46 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29 at para 53. Lord Woolf 
also points out that the more restrictive approach attaches excessive significance to 
the historical origins of the jurisdiction and that if such an approach had been 
taken to injunctions in general, the Mareva jurisdiction would never have 
developed. 
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Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction might be made by someone 
who was not a victim, Lord Woolf makes the obvious response 
that the answer is not to artificially limit the jurisdiction but to 
confine the remedy to the victim of the crime. 
(e) The order should only be made if the applicant has 
established that a wrongdoing (for example a tort or possibly a 
crime) has been committed. The stronger the case against the 
alleged (but unidentified) wrongdoer, the stronger the case for 
grant of the order. That said, it does not appear that the 
minimum threshold standard should be that which applies in 
the case of Anton Piller jurisdiction: namely, an extremely strong 
prima facie case. Anton Piller orders are usually sought to 
prevent the defendant defeating the course of justice through 
destruction/concealment of the material evidence. It permits 
the applicant and his lawyers to enter the defendant’s premises 
to search, seize and make copies of the relevant material. Anton 
Piller orders are concerned with the substantive cause of action 
against the defendant. The Norwich Pharmacal order is different 
in that the respondent is not being compelled to allow search 
for evidence that may be used against the respondent as such. 
The order (at least as originally developed) is limited to the 
identity of the third party wrongdoer.47 This is not to say that 
the strength of the case is irrelevant. Once the threshold of a 
good arguable case of infringement by the wrongdoer is met, 
the strength of the case may be relevant (as one factor) to the 
exercise of the court’s discretion. As Lord Reid put it: the court 
should only grant the order if satisfied that there is no 
substantial chance that an injustice will be done.48 
(f) Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to 
grant the relief includes the strength of the case against the 
wrongdoer, the nature of the relationship between the 
wrongdoer and the respondent and, it is suggested, the nature 
of the wrongdoing and the harm suffered by the applicant. 
There are torts and then there are torts: some may cause severe 
harm to the applicant, others may be far less serious.49 Another 
important factor will be whether the applicant has any other 
                                                                       
47 Note also that the threshold for Mareva injunction (pre-trial in personam order 
over the defendant’s personal assets to prevent the defendant making himself 
judgment proof) appears to be founded on a strong or good prima facie case. 
48 See also Eli Lilly v Neopharma Ltd [2008] EWHC 415 where the court held that 
there is a power to order disclosure of names of customers where those customers 
are arguably wrongdoers. 
49 See, for example, the discussion in Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v 
Hargreaves [2007] EWHC 2375 (different levels of defamatory statements and the 
view that a Norwich Pharmacal order may be disproportionate and unjustifiably 
intrusive in some cases). 
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means for acquiring the identity of the wrongdoer as well as the 
degree of inconvenience that the respondent will be put to if the 
order is made. 
(g) In the normal case, a successful applicant will be 
required to pay the costs of the respondent. 
C. Impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
95 The last ten years or so have seen a spate of cases before the 
English courts and also the European Court of Human Rights on the 
extent to which English law is consistent with the ECHR. In brief, and as 
noted already, Arts 8 and 10 specifically recognise individual rights to 
privacy as well as freedom of expression. The rights in the ECHR, 
however, are not absolute and there is a clear need to balance conflicts 
between the rights by reference to a principle of proportionality. Neither 
the right of privacy or freedom of expression has automatic pre-
eminence although, on the facts of any individual case, where both are 
engaged, one right may be of greater significance than the other. 
96 In addition, the UK also has special statutory provisions in the 
Contempt of Court Act 1981. Section 10 of that Act provides that no 
court is to require a person to disclose the source of information 
contained in a publication for which he is responsible unless this is 
necessary in the interests of justice or national security or for the 
prevention of disorder or crime. In Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN 
Ltd (“Ashworth”),50 Lord Woolf explains that s 10 has the purpose of 
enhancing freedom of the press by protecting journalistic sources. 
However, even s 10 is not sacrosanct for as Lord Woolf points out: 
The judge’s task will always be to weigh in the scales the importance of 
enabling the ends of justice to be attained in the circumstances of the 
particular case on the one hand against the importance of protecting 
the source on the other hand. In this balancing exercise it is only if the 
judge is satisfied that disclosure in the interests of justice is of such 
preponderating importance as to override the statutory privilege 
against disclosure that the threshold of necessity will be reached.
51
 
97 In the Ashworth case, the applicant was a hospital seeking a 
Norwich Pharmacal order against a newspaper which had published an 
                                                                       
50 [2002] UKHL 29. 
51 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29 at 39. For discussion of 
the special policy arguments that arise where Norwich Pharmacal orders are sought 
against newspapers to compel disclosure of sources (essentially freedom of 
information/free press arguments), see Janice Brabyn, “Protection Against 
Judicially Compelled Disclosure of the Identity of News Gatherers’ Confidential 
Sources in Common Law Jurisdictions” (2006) 69(6) MLR 895. 
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article revealing confidential observations about a convicted murderer 
who had gone on a hunger strike. These observations had been placed 
into a database by staff at the hospital. The applicant wanted 
information as to who was the intermediary who had supplied the 
information to the journalist. The purpose was to try and identify the 
hospital staff member who had broken confidence by revealing the 
information to the intermediary. On these facts, a clash arose between 
the hospital’s interest in seeking a remedy against the wrongdoer and 
the newspaper interest in protecting its sources in the name of freedom 
of speech (Art 10) and s 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. 
98 Was the disclosure by means of the Norwich Pharmacal order 
necessary, proportionate and such as to meet a “pressing social need”? 
What was the pressing social need to support the grant of the relief? The 
need was not simply the interests of the hospital in asserting its 
contractual rights against its disloyal staff member, it was also felt 
important to underscore the importance of safeguarding personal data, 
especially medical data. Respect for the privacy of medical data was of 
“fundamental importance” to a person’s enjoyment of his/her right to 
respect for private and family life. Lord Woolf had no doubt that this 
was the case. Indeed, his Lordship cited the decision of the European 
Court in Z v Finland52 that respecting confidentiality of health data “was 
crucial not only to respect the sense of privacy of a patient but also to 
preserve his or her confidence in the medical profession and in the 
health services in general”. Lord Woolf concluded in words that bear 
repeating: 
The care of patients at Ashworth is fraught with danger and difficulty. 
The disclosure of patients’ records increases that danger and difficulty 
and to deter the same or similar wrongdoing in the future it is 
essential that the source should be identified and punished. This was 
what made the orders proportionate and justified… The source’s 
disclosure was wholly inconsistent with the security of the records and 
the disclosure was made worse because it was purchased by a cash 
payment.
53
 [emphasis added] 
99 The Ashworth case is immensely important in the UK for it 
signals a judicial willingness to develop and expand the Norwich 
Pharmacal jurisdiction. It is significant for a number of reasons: 
                                                                       
52 (1998) EHRR 371 at 95. 
53 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] UKHL 29 at 66. See also Lord 
Hobhouse in the same case at para 73 that the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction was 
consistent with the ECHR provided that it is only used to obtain disclosure of 
journalist sources when it is proportionate to do so. See also a paper by Bellamy & 
Dunlop, “Norwich Pharmacal Proceedings and Human Rights” available  
at: http://www.39essex.co.uk/documents/JB_RDU_Norwich_Pharmacal_paper_ 
060207.pdf (accessed 16 August 2008). 
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(a) First, for rooting the jurisdiction on the public interest 
in seeing that justice is done by granting the discovery order so 
that the victim can seek a remedy in the law. 
(b) Second, because of the acceptance that the remedy may 
not necessarily be initiation of civil proceedings: it can also 
include self-help legal action such as termination of a contract 
with the wrongdoer and initiation of criminal proceedings 
(possibly by means of a private prosecution). 
(c) Third, because it is strong English authority to the 
effect that the Norwich Pharmacal order is not inconsistent with 
the ECHR or the English Contempt of Court Act. Even 
journalists who may have a strong claim to protect sources 
(freedom of expression) may be subject to disclosure orders 
where this is necessary and proportionate. 
(d) Fourth, because the decision underscores the 
importance of medical confidentiality even where the patient is 
a criminal who has been convicted of murder. 
(e) Fifth, because it demonstrates how obligations of 
confidentiality/privacy may be protected in appropriate cases 
through judicious use of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. 
On the facts of Ashworth, the claim by the journalist to protect 
the “confidentiality” of his sources as part of his assertion of free 
speech was outweighed by the need to safeguard the 
confidentiality interests of the hospital and of course the public 
interest in keeping medical records confidential and private. 
100 Important though the Ashworth case is, it did not, however, 
address the interface between IPR and discovery of the identity of the 
wrongdoer in the light of the privacy provisions in Art 8 of the ECHR. 
But there is now the very important decision of the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) in the case of Productores de Musica de Espana 
Promusicae v Telefonica de Espana (“Espana”)54 on discovery and 
European Community law. 
101 Espana concerned an application by a Spanish music 
organisation (applicant) which appears to represent the interests of 
music copyright owners in respect of use of music on the Internet. The 
complaint was that Spanish internet subscribers who had used the 
services of a Spanish ISP (respondent) had committed copyright 
infringement by downloading and distributing songs using P2P 
software. The problem was that whilst the applicant knew the IP 
addresses of the subscribers and the date and time when the internet 
connection and downloads had occurred, they were unable to see 
                                                                       
54 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), 29 January 2008. Case C-275/06. 
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behind the IP address so as to identify the subscribers whose internet 
account had been used. Without this information, it would have been 
very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce the copyright. The 
respondent refused to supply the information on the basis that Spanish 
law only permitted such disclosures in criminal investigations or in 
matters of public security and national defence. In this context, the 
applicant referred the matter to the ECJ for a ruling as to whether EU 
Member States were bound, in order to ensure the effective protection 
of copyright, to recognise an obligation to communicate personal data 
for use in civil proceedings. 
102 The European Community Law framework behind the 
reference is complex involving several EU Directives: 
(a) Directive 2000/31/EC: Legal Aspects of Information 
Society Services (E-Commerce). 
(b) Directive 2001/29/EC: Harmonization of Copyright 
and Information Society. 
(c) Directive 2004/48/EC: Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights. 
(d) Directive 1995/46/EC: Data Protection 
(e) Directive 2002/58/EC: Personal data and privacy. 
103 The E-Commerce Directive (2000) is concerned with the proper 
functioning of the internal market by ensuring the free movement of 
information society services between the Member States. To this end, it 
sets out provisions relating to the establishment of service providers, 
commercial communications, electronic contracts, the liability of 
intermediaries, codes of conduct, out-of-court dispute settlements, 
court actions and co-operation between Member States. 
104 Article 15(1) provides that there is no general obligation on ISPs 
to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general 
obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal 
activity. Article 15(2) then goes on to state that: “Member States may 
establish obligations for information society service providers promptly 
to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities 
undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or 
obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their 
request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their 
service with whom they have storage agreements.” 
105 The Harmonization of Copyright and Information Services 
Directive (2001) is primarily about legal protection of copyright and 
related rights in the context of the development of the EU internal 
market with particular emphasis on the information society. The 
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Directive deals with matters ranging from the nature and range of 
exclusive rights to be granted to copyright owners such as reproduction, 
communication and/or making available to the public, distribution, 
exceptions and limitations, protection of technological measures and 
rights-management information and so forth. Of especial importance 
were the provisions in Art 8 on sanctions and remedies and the 
requirement that Member States were to provide remedies and 
sanctions which would be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. It is 
also provided that the Directive is without prejudice to (amongst other 
things) laws on confidentiality and privacy. 
106 The Directive on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
(2004) deals with measures, procedures and remedies necessary to 
ensure enforcement of IPR. As in the case of the 2001 Harmonization 
Directive, measures are required that will be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. In particular, Art 8 states that judicial authorities in Member 
States may order information on the origin of goods and services to be 
provided, inter alia, by a person who was involved in the provision of 
the services. Once again, this is without prejudice to laws governing 
confidential information or the processing of personal data. 
107 The Data Protection Directive (1995) requires Member States to 
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons 
especially in respect of their claim to privacy and the processing of 
personal data. Personal data refers to any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural subject. Article 13 allows Member 
States to adopt legislative measures to restrict certain rights when the 
restriction is necessary to safeguard, inter alia, the prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of 
breaches of ethics for regulated professions as well as for the protection 
of the rights or freedoms of others. 
108 The Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications (2002) 
has a similar general objective (protecting privacy and personal data) 
but with special reference to the electronic communication sector. These 
include duties to protect the confidentiality of the communications. 
Article 15 allows restrictions to some of the rights where the restriction 
is necessary, appropriate and proportionate to safeguard, inter alia, 
national security, investigation of criminal offences or of unauthorised 
use of the electronic communication system. 
109 Given the above framework, was there an obligation on Spain 
under EU law to provide a procedure whereby IPR holders can obtain 
the identity and real world addresses of internet service subscribers 
whose IP address had been used in connection with copyright 
infringement by means of the Internet? Under Spanish domestic law, it 
appeared that communication of the requested information was only 
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permitted in connection with criminal investigations or for purposes 
connected with public security or national defence. Was this consistent 
with the requirements of Community law? The ECJ accepted that there 
was nothing in the 2002 Directive that compelled Spain to lay down an 
obligation to disclose information in the context of civil proceedings. 
Spanish law was, therefore, consistent with Community Law. This did 
not mean, however, that Member States could not choose to introduce 
such a provision as the ECJ also held that the 2002 Directive “did not 
preclude the possibility for the Member States of laying down an 
obligation to disclose personal data in the context of civil proceedings”. 
110 The question then arose as to whether Community IP law 
which after all did require effective protection of IP would demand or 
permit the creation of such an obligation. On this, the ECJ again came 
to the view that there was nothing in the copyright Directives or indeed 
TRIPS that compelled Member States to lay down an obligation to 
communicate personal data in the context of civil proceedings. 
However, this did not mean that a Member State could not introduce or 
develop such an obligation. This could be done so long as a 
proportionate and balanced approach was taken in respect of the 
competing interests: the property interests of the right holder, the right 
to effective judicial protection as weighed against the fundamental right 
of protection for personal data and private life.55 
111 On this basis, whilst the copyright owners effectively lost in 
Spain, the decision of the ECJ supports or at least permits other 
Member States such as the UK to require disclosure of names and 
addresses of internet subscribers in an attempt to provide effective 
remedies – provided that a balanced and proportional approach was 
taken that takes account of the competing privacy interests at stake. 
Whilst there has yet to be a decision by the ECJ on the compatibility of 
the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction (as applied to internet subscriber 
identity), there is every reason to believe that the balancing exercise to 
be carried out within the equitable (discretionary) nature of the relief 
will be found consistent with Community law. Further, it seems to 
follow that the balanced approach taken by Norwich Pharmacal is also 
consistent with the ECHR. 
112 Indeed, there have been cases before the English courts where 
Norwich Pharmacal orders were sought in the context of defamation 
                                                                       
55 Note that Advocate General Kokott in his Advisory Opinion (18 July 2007) took a 
different view, namely, that Community law only permitted communication of 
personal data traffic to competent state authorities and not directly to copyright 
holders who wished to commence civil proceedings. For an interesting online 
discussion as to whether IP addresses are in themselves personal information, see 
http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2008/02/are-ip-addresses-personal.html 
(accessed 16 August 2008). 
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proceedings in respect of material hosted on Internet websites. In 
Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd,56 the applicant was an English ISP whose 
complaint was that websites operated by the defendants and which 
hosted discussion boards (open to the public) contained defamatory 
material posted by an anonymous contributor called “Z Dust”. The 
applicant sought a Norwich Pharmacal order to compel the website 
operators to disclose the identity of Z Dust. Neither defendant disputed 
the applicability of the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction: what was in 
issue was whether the court should exercise its discretion in favour of 
the applicant. 
113 One website operator took a neutral stance that whilst it neither 
consented to nor opposed the application it was concerned over the 
impact of disclosure on its obligation to protect the privacy of the 
information in question. 
114 The second website operator objected to the order on the basis 
of its obligations under the Data Protection Act and the privacy policy 
incorporated into the terms and conditions of access to the website by 
members of the public. These terms were said to prohibit disclosure of 
personal details about any account holder to a third party in these 
circumstances. 
115 At first instance, Owen J decided in favour of the application 
even though the applicant did not know at this stage whether it would 
in fact launch civil proceedings against the wrongdoer. An attempt by 
one of the website operators to assert that the applicant was effectively 
on a fishing expedition failed. If the applicant was merely trying to find 
out if a wrong had been committed, that would be an abuse of the 
jurisdiction. But that was not the purpose of the application. As Owen J 
put it: “… the problem facing the claimant is that it does not know, and 
has no means of discovering the identity of Z Dust. If and when the 
identity of Z Dust is established it will be necessary for the claimant to 
consider with its legal advisers the most effective means of protecting its 
legal rights. That may or may not involve legal proceedings.”57 
                                                                       
56 [2001] EWCA 1897. 
57 As for the argument that s 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 only allowed 
disclosure in the technical sense of administration of justice in the course of legal 
proceedings, Owen J opined that this was too narrow a reading. What was required 
was disclosure in the interests of justice: that persons should be enabled to exercise 
important legal rights and to protect themselves from serious legal wrongs, 
whether or not resort to legal proceedings in a court of law would be necessary to 
attain these objectives. In any case, s 10 of the 1981 Act was only concerned with 
protection of journalist sources and that it was directed towards resolving tensions 
between the public interest in a free press and in enabling justice to be attained by a 
party seeking to enforce or protect its legal rights. Owen J explains that a journalist 
is responsible at law for the material which he publishes. The operators of the 
website did not take responsibility and exercised no editorial control over material 
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116 Whilst the website operators had a policy of confidentiality with 
regard to the personal information of those using its websites, the court 
had no doubt that the balance of interests, on the facts, came down in 
favour of granting relief. “To find otherwise would be to give the clearest 
indication to those who wish to defame that they can do so with 
impunity behind the screen of anonymity made possible by the use of 
websites on the Internet.”58 
D. The Hong Kong position: Norwich Pharmacal and identity of 
subscribers 
117 The leading decision is that of Ma J. (as he then was) in A Co v B 
Co.59 In that case, a Norwich Pharmacal order was sought to assist the 
applicant in respect of tracing claims. The applicant was a US company 
in the footwear business and who had engaged one SB as its Vice 
President of Global Sourcing. Evidence was put before the court which 
pointed to SB receiving secret commissions in respect of his work and 
that these had been deposited into an account opened at the defendant’s 
bank. In short, the court was satisfied that there was “clear evidence of a 
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of SB on a very significant scale”. 
The defendant had become involved in the wrongdoing as “monies 
                                                                                                                               
posted. That being so, s 10 was not relevant to the case at hand. As for the Data 
Protection Act 1998, s 35 allows disclosure of personal data in connection with 
legal proceedings including prospective legal proceedings. This essentially 
preserved the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. On potential substantive liability of 
an ISP for defamatory material hosted on a website by users when the ISP had 
knowledge of the content, see Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201. See 
also a successful claim in Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v Hargreaves [2007] 
EWHC 2375. 
58 Much of the material posted was clearly defamatory and the applicant had 
established a strong prima facie case against Z Dust. Owen J also ordered the 
defendants to pay the costs of the application. On appeal, the decision on costs was 
reversed. The Court of Appeal held that the normal rule in Norwich Pharmacal 
applications is that the applicant should pay the costs of the disclosing party 
including the costs of disclosure. This was because the proceedings were not truly 
adversarial. Whilst in some cases it may be appropriate to award costs against the 
discloser, this was not so where: (a) the discloser had a genuine doubt as to whether 
the applicant was entitled to disclosure; (b) the discloser was under an appropriate 
legal obligation not to reveal the information or where the legal position was not 
clear or the party had a reasonable doubt as to the obligations; (c) the party could 
be subject to proceedings if the disclosure was voluntary; or (d) the party would or 
might suffer damage if it gave voluntary disclosure; or (e) the disclosure would or 
might infringe a legitimate interest of another. For other cases where Norwich 
Pharmacal orders have been granted against website administrators, see Sunderland 
Housing Company and Peter Walls v Baines (2006) decision of Eady J and discussed 
at: Law in Business: Libel. Netting Slanders at: 
http://www.legalweek.com/Company/360/Navigation/18/Articles/130177/Law+In
+Business+Libel+Netting+slanders.html (accessed 16 August 2008). See also 
Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd v Hargreaves [2007] EWHC 2375. 
59 High Court, HK SAR 2002, HCMP336/2002. 
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which may well represent secret commissions have passed in and out of 
accounts held in the defendant bank in the names of companies 
associated with SB”. 
118 Ma J in granting the relief made a number of significant 
observations of the scope and purpose of the Norwich Pharmacal 
jurisdiction: 
(a) The jurisdiction is founded in equity and is essentially 
concerned with the duty of innocent persons who have become 
caught up or involved in tortious or wrongful activities of 
others (in the sense of facilitation) to assist the victim of the 
tort or wrongful activities by provision of full information.60 
(b) The jurisdiction is a wide one and is not restricted to 
disclosures of names of wrongdoers.61 
(c) Though founded on notions of justice, the relief is 
extraordinary and one which should not be granted lightly. 
“Powerful factors” were said to be needed because of the 
characteristics (effect) of the order. These included the very 
salient point that there will often be a legal relationship between 
the innocent party (the bank) and the wrongdoer (bank 
customer) which involves strict duties to be observed on the 
innocent party’s part. Disclosure of customer information 
outside of a court order might expose the innocent party to civil 
and/or criminal liability (including breach of confidentiality). 
(d) There must be “cogent and compelling evidence” to 
demonstrate that “serious tortious or wrongful activities have 
taken place. Where allegations of fraud (and similar serious 
allegations) are made, the degree of proof must correspondingly 
be high.62 
                                                                       
60 This is significant because originally the jurisdiction was confined to information 
as to the identity and address of the wrongdoer. On the facts, the applicant knew 
who the wrongdoer was: what was needed was assistance to trace where the funds 
have been moved to so as to mount tracing claims by way of restitutionary relief. 
61 Citing the English case of Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 124. See also 
Carlton Film Distributors Ltd v VDC Ltd [2003] EWHC 616 and also Mitsui & Co 
Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 per Lightman J that the Norwich 
Pharmacal relief was a flexible remedy capable of adaptation to new circumstances. 
62 This is an important point as it relates to the threshold standard required (proof of 
wrongdoing) to activate Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. Indeed, this became a 
point of contention in the Odex case in Singapore. Note that Ma J was not 
necessarily holding that the standard required is the same as is needed in Anton 
Piller cases (extremely strong prima facie case). Indeed, later on in his judgment, 
the learned judge observed that to some extent all applications for Norwich 
Pharmacal relief involve the plaintiff fishing for information and he also noted that 
in P v T Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1309, the court granted the order even though it could 
not be ascertained without the information sought whether or not a third party 
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(e) It must be demonstrated that the order “will or will 
likely reap substantial and worthwhile benefits for the plaintiff”. 
In the case of information for tracing claims, there must be a 
serious possibility that the discovery will allow the plaintiff to 
preserve or to discover the whereabouts of his assets.63 
119 More recently, the HK courts have considered the availability of 
Norwich Pharmacal relief in two related cases that concern identity of 
subscribers to internet services. Both of these cases involve infringement 
of copyright in musical works on the Internet through use of P2P 
technology. Would the HK courts set aside the cloak of anonymity and 
compel the ISPs to reveal the identity of the subscribers whose IP 
addresses were associated with the infringements? Unsurprisingly, the 
ISPs were concerned that if they voluntarily made disclosure they would 
be exposed to liability under the Personal Data (Privacy) Protection 
Ordinance as well as be in breach of the confidentiality provisions set 
out in their internet licences granted by the Telecommunications 
Authority. 
120 The first was the decision of Poon J in Cinepoly v Hong Kong 
Broadband Network Ltd.64 Given that the threshold standard (described 
by Ma J) had been met, should the discretion be exercised in favour of 
relief? The principal counterbalancing interest was the right of the 
subscribers to protect their personal data under the Data Protection 
legislation.65 Important though this legislation was, Poon J rightly 
underscored the principle that the protection afforded was not absolute. 
A balance had to be struck between administration of justice and 
protection of privacy in personal data.66 In granting the relief, Poon J 
made some general observations on internet piracy by way of a timely 
reminder. These are worth repeating. The learned judge states: 
                                                                                                                               
had committed a tort against the plaintiff. In England, it seems that the test is 
whether a wrong has been carried out or arguably carried out by the wrongdoer. 
Mitsui & Co Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 and Hughes v 
Carratu International plc [2006] EWHC 1791. 
63 Citing the English case of Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim (No 5) [1992] 2 All ER 
911. 
64 HCMP 2487/2005. The second case is Cinepoly v HK Broadband HCMP 943/2006 
(Chan J). 
65 The other interest was the confidentiality obligation set out in its 
telecommunications licence. Poon J found that where an innocent person makes 
discovery voluntarily under Norwich Pharmacal principles, whether voluntarily or 
compelled by the court exercising its equitable jurisdiction, the discovery is 
authorised and required by the law. 
66 Section 58(1)(d) of the Personal Data (Privacy) Protection Ordinance (Cap 486) in 
particular exempted disclosure in connection with the prevention, preclusion or 
remedying (including punishment) of unlawful or seriously improper conduct or 
dishonesty or malpractice by persons. 
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The Internet is invaluable and even indispensable, some would suggest 
to the free communication, dissemination and sharing of information 
in modern societies. For my part, I have no intention whatsoever to 
restrict, obstruct or otherwise frustrate the free flow of 
communication and information on the Internet. My determination 
in this action does not and should not be understood to have such 
effect. What I do hope is that it can serve as a timely reminder. Users 
of the Internet, like any individuals, must abide by the law. And the 
law protects users’ rights as much as others’ legitimate rights, 
including those of copyright owners. Some online copyright infringers 
may well think that they will never be caught because of the cloak of 
anonymity created by the P2P programs. They are wrong. And from 
now on they should think twice. They can no longer hide behind the 
cloak of anonymity. The court can and will upon a successful 
application pull back the cloak and expose their true identity. It is not 
an intrusion into their privacy. It does not even lie in their mouths to 
say so. For protection of privacy is never and cannot be used as a 
shield to enable them to commit civil wrongs with impunity. 
121 The Hong Kong courts clearly have embraced and developed 
the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction in a way that recognises the 
difficulty that IPR owners have encountered in enforcing their rights 
against internet users. 
E. Norwich Pharmacal: The Singapore position and the Odex 
litigation 
122 Substantial reference to Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction in 
Singapore arose in 1992 when Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was), in 
discussing the existence and basis of the Anton Piller jurisdiction (pre-
trial preservation of evidence), noted the relationship between the two 
forms of relief. The point being made was that the Anton Piller order 
whilst originally concerned with preservation of evidence of liability 
had since expanded to include a secondary purpose: namely, to obtain 
evidence with a view to bringing proceedings against third parties who 
might also be involved in the infringements. In this way, it was said that 
the Anton Piller jurisdiction was itself founded on the right to discovery 
of information which had been revived in England by the decision in 
Norwich Pharmacal.67 If the Singapore courts accepted an Anton Piller 
                                                                       
67 Reebok International Ltd v Royal Corp [1992] 2 SLR 136. Since then, there have 
been a number of Singapore cases involving Norwich Pharmacal relief including: 
KLW Holdings Ltd v Singapore Press Holdings Ltd [2002] 4 SLR 417 (decision of 
Choo Han Teck JC as he then was); Re E [2003] SGDC 84 (decision of District 
Judge Lim); UMCI Ltd v Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co [2006] 4 LR 95 
(decision of Sundaresh Menon JC as he then was) and of course Odex Pte Ltd v 
Pacific Internet Ltd [2007] SGDC 248 (District Judge Earnest Lau) and also [2008] 
3 SLR 18 (Woo Bih Li J.) Note that in Abraham v Law Society of Singapore [1991] 3 
MLJ 359, Rajendran J held that the Rules of the Supreme Court 1970 only allowed 
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jurisdiction, did it not follow by necessary implication that a Norwich 
Pharmacal jurisdiction also existed? 
(1) Source/nature of Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction in Singapore 
123 It has been said that the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction in 
England originated in the old Chancery Bill of Discovery, the purpose of 
which was to enable A to obtain information from B to pursue his 
remedies against C.68 The common law courts lacking the power to 
order pre-trial discovery, litigants before the courts of common law had 
to turn to the Court of Chancery for equitable orders of discovery, 
inspection and interrogatories.69 Equity not only spawned equitable 
principles/doctrines that affected the substantive rights of parties such 
as the trust, equitable ownership, fiduciary duties, obligations of 
confidence and equitable remedies such as accounting of profits, it also 
developed procedures such as discovery to aid litigants. In this way, it 
appears that the guiding spirit, that conscience is equity, gave birth to a 
mix of substantive as well as procedural innovations. 
124 In terms of its substantive law, Singapore can trace much of its 
law all the way back to the Second Charter of Justice (1826). The Second 
Charter set up a new court system for Singapore, Penang and Malacca 
and was directed to hear cases according to “justice and right”: an 
expression that was interpreted to refer to the law of England.70 English 
law (common law and equity) became part of the fabric of Singapore 
law.71 
125 If the Chancery Bill of Discovery is properly regarded as a 
“cause of action” that affects the substantive rights of individuals (as for 
example the concept of trust), a case might be made for saying that the 
                                                                                                                               
discovery where there was a cause or matter pending and that the Norwich 
Pharmacal decision was of little assistance as s 18 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed) allowed the High Court to order discovery 
only in accordance with written law or Rules of Court. No argument appears to 
have been made as to the possibility of an inherent jurisdiction to grant Norwich 
Pharmacal relief. 
68 Reebok International Ltd v Royal Corp [1992] 2 SLR 136 at [19] per Chan Sek 
Keong JC (as he then was). 
69 Graphically described by Sir Jack I H Jacob as “scraping the conscience of the 
defendant” in his work: The Fabric of English Civil Justice and quoted by the 
District Court of Singapore in Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2007] SGDC 248. 
70 R v Willans (1858) 3 Ky 16 at 37. 
71 See also Helena Chan, The Legal System of Singapore (Butterworths, 1995) at p 19 
that s 3 of the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Rev Ed) provides that 
English common law and equity so far as it was a part of Singapore law 
immediately before the commencement of the Act continued to be part of the law 
of Singapore subject to a “local circumstances” type proviso. Reception of English 
rules of equity effectively dates back to the Second Charter of Justice. 
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Second Charter of Justice is the source of the applicability of that 
equitable principle in Singapore.72 
126 But, on the other hand, as seems much more likely, at least at 
first glance, the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction may be regarded as a 
procedural innovation in aid of a cause of action established by 
reference to some other substantive right, such as those within tort law. 
If so, then it seems that the source of the Singapore courts’ power to 
grant Norwich Pharmacal discovery orders would have to be found in 
the “constitutional” documents of the current Singapore court system. 
127 The current superior court system (High Court and Court of 
Appeal) in Singapore derives from the Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act.73 Section 18 provides that the High Court shall have such powers as 
are vested in it by written law in force in Singapore including those set 
out in the First Schedule. This in turn leads us to r 12 which in its 
current form provides that the High Court has the power before or after 
any proceedings are commenced to order discovery of facts or 
documents by any party to the proceedings or by any other person in 
such manner as may be proscribed by Rules of Court (emphasis added). 
128 Order 24 rule 6 now contains specific provisions dealing with 
discovery against other persons. It provides that: “An application for an 
order for the discovery of documents before the commencement of 
proceedings shall be made by originating summons and the person 
against whom the order is sought shall be made defendant to the 
originating summons.” 
129 Order 24 rule 6(5) then states: “An order for the discovery of 
documents before the commencement of proceedings or for the 
discovery of documents by a person who is not a party to the 
proceedings may be made by the Court for the purpose of or with a 
view to identifying possible parties to any proceedings in such 
circumstances where the Court thinks it just to make such an order, and 
on such terms as it thinks just.” 
130 Finally, O 24 r 7 provides that: “On the hearing of an 
application for an order under Rule 1, 5 or 6, the Court may, if satisfied 
that discovery is not necessary, or not necessary at that stage of the cause 
or matter, dismiss or, as the case may be, adjourn the application and 
                                                                       
72 Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commr [1973] 3 WLR 164. In argument, 
counsel for the applicants asserted that there was a long line of English case law 
supporting discovery of the name of a prospective litigant starting with Heathcote v 
Fleete (1702) 2 Vern 442 and also the 1876 decision of Orr v Diaper (1876) 
4 Ch D 92. 
73 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed). 
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shall in any case refuse to make such an order if and so far as it is of 
opinion that discovery is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the 
cause or matter or for saving costs.” 
131 In the Odex case, the District Court explained that the 
provisions on discovery against other persons found in O 24 r 6 date 
back to legislative amendments made in 1993 and that “pre-action 
discovery of wrongdoer identity was codified in what is now O 24 
r 6(5)”. 
132 Important though O 24 r 6(5) clearly is, the question of a 
“lingering” Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction that flows from the inherent 
power of the court to control its court procedure so as to achieve justice 
remains; after all what if the applicant seeks information that is 
designed to enable him to formulate his case against a known defendant 
or to take/initiate appropriate criminal proceedings or to simply take 
appropriate self-help disciplinary proceedings against the wrongdoer? 
133 Does the Singapore High Court retain an inherent jurisdiction 
at least over its own procedure? This is an important question that 
deserves full airing. Fortunately, there are the seminal articles of 
Professor Pinsler to which readers are referred for a thorough analysis of 
the question.74 For our purposes, it is perhaps enough to point out that 
the existence of an inherent jurisdiction has been accepted by the 
Singapore High Court in at least two recent decisions. 
134 The first is the decision of Phang J (as he then was) in Wellmix 
Organics (International) Pte Ltd v Lau Yu Man.75 This case which 
concerned the interpretation and enforcement of “unless consent 
orders” raised an issue over whether the court retained a residuary 
discretion over the enforcement of such an order. Phang J. had no doubt 
that such a residuary jurisdiction existed. To begin with, the learned 
judge agreed that the existence of such a jurisdiction drew support from 
“the inherent powers of the court to govern what is, in the final analysis, 
procedure that is peculiar to the governance of its own process – all with 
a view towards attainment of both procedural as well as substantive 
justice”. Further support for the recognition (cf source) of inherent 
jurisdiction was said to be found in the saving provisions of O 92 r 4 
which expressly refers to the inherent powers of the court to make 
orders to prevent injustice or to prevent abuse of process.76 Whilst it has 
                                                                       
74 Pinsler, “The Inherent Powers of the Court” [1997] SJLS 1; Pinsler, “Inherent 
Jurisdiction Revisited: An Expanding Doctrine” (2002) 14 SAcLJ 1. 
75 [2006] 2 SLR 117. 
76 Earlier cases on inherent jurisdiction referred to include: Four Pillars Enterprises Co 
Ltd v Beiersdorf Aktiengesellschaft [1991] 1 SLR 737; Tan Kok Ing v Tan Swee Meng 
[2003] 1 SLR 657; Wee Soon Kim Anthony v Law Society of Singapore [2001] 4 SLR 
25; and Roberto Building Material Pte Ltd v OCBC [2003] 2 SLR 353. 
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been said that O 92 r 4 does not confer a carte blanche to create any 
procedural device that it thinks fit, there is strong support for a limited 
inherent jurisdiction that can be invoked in exceptional cases where 
there is a clear need for it and the justice of the case so demands. 
135 The second is the decision of S Menon JC (as he then was) in 
UMCI Ltd v Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd.77 In 
this case, the learned Judicial Commissioner stated that: “The Rules of 
Court … spell out many of the powers of our courts to manage and 
regulate civil cases. The powers contained there are complemented by 
the courts’ inherent jurisdiction, an amorphous source of power to do 
that which is deemed appropriate in the circumstances to secure the 
ends of justice.” The court agreed that the touchstone for exercising an 
inherent jurisdiction is one of necessity, as assessed in a sensible manner 
in respect of all the circumstances of the case. The court also observed 
that the procedure set out in O 24 r 6 overlaps with the Norwich 
Pharmacal jurisdiction and it also accepted that if the application fell 
outside the scope of the O 24 r 6 that the court might be able to exercise 
an inherent jurisdiction to make the order requested.78 
136 Given these decisions, the approach taken in the Odex litigation 
in Singapore was to first examine whether the application fell within 
O 24 r 6. Alternatively, if the application fell outside of O 24 r 6, the 
question was whether it was necessary to exercise the residual inherent 
Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction in the circumstances before the court. 
(2) Who has the right to seek discovery under O 24 r 6 and/or 
Norwich Pharmacal in Singapore? The locus standi issue 
137 The crux of the issue here was whether it was necessary for the 
applicant to establish that it had the legal right to initiate legal 
proceedings against the wrongdoers for the wrongdoing that lay at the 
heart of the application. Alternatively, would it be sufficient if the 
applicant was an interested party (in the sense that its economic 
interests were at stake) and that they intended to pass the information to 
the persons who had sufficient legal status to initiate proceedings? 
138 Both the District Court and the High Court came to the view 
that the applicant had to establish that it possessed the necessary 
standing to bring proceedings for the wrongdoing in question. In the 
case of O 24 r 6, the District Court noted that O 24 did not apply to 
                                                                       
77 [2006] 4 SLR 95. 
78 Note that S Menon JC, referring to the English Mitsui decision of Lightman J 
underscored the fact that the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction had been extended to 
cover a variety of situations and that those categories are not closed. Mitsui & Co 
Ltd v Nexen Petroleum UK Ltd [2005] EWHC 625 
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criminal proceedings. Thus, the fact that the information might be 
helpful for a prosecution for copyright infringement was irrelevant. 
What was needed was a connection to relevant civil proceedings. 
139 The difficulty here was that the right to bring proceedings for 
copyright infringement under the Copyright Act of Singapore79 is given 
to the copyright owner and his exclusive licensee.80 A non-exclusive 
licensee is not given a statutory right of suit even though his commercial 
interests (in the non-exclusive licence) will depend on effective legal 
action being brought against the infringers. 
140 If Odex was neither the copyright owner nor the exclusive 
licensee of the anime titles in question, could it claim on behalf of the 
copyright owners on the basis that it was an agent or representative of 
the owners? Before the District Court, it appears that the application 
was formulated on the basis that Odex was applying in its own right as a 
licensee. In only one instance did it appear that Odex was an exclusive 
licensee. That being so, the application failed in most of the cases 
because of lack of locus standi. In the one case where the District Court 
found that Odex was an exclusive licensee, the application failed as the 
District Court was not satisfied that a sufficiently strong case on 
infringement had been established. 
141 On appeal, it was argued that the applications were in fact made 
by Odex as an authorised agent of the copyright owners and not in their 
capacity as a licensee. But, even if this was so, this did not help as the 
High Court held that Singapore law did not permit an agent of a 
copyright owner to apply in the agent’s name for pre-action discovery in 
order to identify infringers. The reasons, in brief, were as follows. 
142 First, whilst Art 16.9.22(b)(xi) of the US-Singapore FTA 
required Singapore to establish procedures to enable copyright owners 
to obtain expeditiously from an ISP, information identifying alleged 
infringers, there was nothing in that Article which related to 
applications by authorised agents.81 
                                                                       
79 (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed). 
80 See Alliance Entertainment Singapore Pte Ltd v Sim Kay Teck [2007] 2 SLR 869. 
81 References to statements made by the Singapore Government in respect of the FTA 
to persons acting on behalf of the copyright owner in respect of the notice take 
down procedure protecting ISPs were also found (rightly) to be irrelevant. But see 
Note 16-15 of the FTA which states that for the purpose of enforcement of IPR, 
right holder includes exclusive licensees as well as federations and associations 
having the legal standing to assert such rights. Does this help? Probably not since 
(i) the federation, etc, must have the legal standing to assert the right (which begs 
the question …) (ii) the FTA is not self executing under Singapore law. 
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143 Second, whilst a practice direction82 had been issued which 
referred to applications for discovery “by or on behalf of an owner or 
exclusive licensee of copyright material against a network service 
provider for information relating to the identity” of an alleged 
infringing user, this practice direction did not and could not purport to 
create additional rights since practice directions did not have the force 
of law and were merely directions issued for administrative purposes.83 
144 Third, under the Copyright Act (and its regulations) there is no 
provision allowing an agent to apply for discovery on behalf of the 
copyright owner. 
145 Tricky issues also arose as to whether Odex could claim in its 
“capacity” as the victim of a crime that needed redress. The point has 
been made earlier that the English courts have extended the Norwich 
Pharmacal jurisdiction to include discovery of identity of wrongdoers in 
aid of possible criminal proceedings. It will be recalled that in Ashworth 
Security Hospital v MGN Ltd (“Ashworth”),84 Lord Woolf stressed that 
the prosecution may achieve for the victim the very remedy that is 
needed and that new situations will arise where it will be appropriate for 
the jurisdiction to be exercised where it has not been exercised before. 
Fears that the jurisdiction might be abused in the sense of claims being 
brought by a person who is not a victim of the wrongdoing was best 
dealt with by confining the remedy to the victim of a crime. Clearly, the 
public interest would not support applications for Norwich Pharmacal 
orders under the Singapore court’s inherent jurisdiction where the 
applicant is a member of the public who has not been specifically 
impacted by the crime. But, as noted by Lord Woolf, the simple answer 
would be to confine the remedy to the victim of the crime. 
146 Who then is the victim of a crime for these purposes? This is by 
no means an easy question to answer. It cannot be limited to the person 
who is entitled to bring parallel civil proceedings for the relevant tort. If 
this were so, what would happen if there was no civil right of action 
created by a statutory provision that imposes criminal liability? Would it 
make sense to limit the expansion of Norwich Pharmacal to criminal 
offences only when there was a parallel matching civil cause of action 
even though the victim does not intend to make use of his civil right of 
action? Neither can it mean any individual member of the public on the 
basis that all members of society are “victims” of a crime. 
                                                                       
82 ePractice Direction 4 of 2005 on Discovery/Interrogatories and Network Service 
Providers. 
83 Citing Lai Siu Chiu J in BNP v Polynesia Timber Services Pte Ltd [2002] 4 SLR 933 
and also Pinsler, Supreme Court Practice 2006 (Butterworths). 
84 [2003] FSR 17. 
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147 The District Court comments that the Ashworth decision was an 
important one which gave victims of crime access to the civil courts for 
the purposes of identifying wrongdoers so that criminal action can be 
taken. District Judge Earnest Lau certainly accepts that if the victim of 
the crime also enjoyed a civil right of action in respect of the same 
wrongdoing that he would have sufficient locus standi to apply under 
O 24 r 6(5). The District Court felt that in such cases, the information 
could be used to initiate criminal proceedings.85 
148 But what if, as in the Odex case, the applicant has no locus standi 
to assert O 24 r 6(5) because he is a mere licensee of the copyright? Can 
such a person pray in aid of the residual inherent jurisdiction to grant 
Norwich Pharmacal relief on the basis of necessity and justice and 
because he is the victim of a crime? The District Court answered this in 
the negative because criminal prosecutions, it was said, had to brought 
by “the Attorney General (either directly or by issue of a fiat) or the 
person aggrieved by the offence”. 
149 On appeal, the High Court took a slightly different approach 
(because of the way the appeal was argued). Given that before the High 
Court, the applicant had argued that it made the application as agent of 
the copyright owners, Woo Bih Li J held that: 
[I]t seemed to me that the agent is not the victim of the wrongdoing. 
Accordingly, under the NP jurisdiction as extended by Ashworth, 
assuming Ashworth to apply in Singapore, Odex would still not be the 
right party entitled to relief …
86
 
150 A number of points arise on this conclusion. First, if the 
application proceeded on the basis that Odex was acting as agent for the 
copyright owner, would it follow that the equivalent assertion for 
extending the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction (outside O 24 r 6) is that 
“the victim of the crime” is to be taken as a reference in this context to 
the copyright owner? Second, is there not in any case some justification 
for regarding Odex as the victim of the crime (commercial copyright 
infringement)? 
                                                                       
85 Applying Microsoft Corp v SM Summit Holdings Ltd [1999] 4 SLR 529, Riddick v 
Thames Board Mills [1977] QB 881 and Ransome Tempil Inc v Romar Positioning 
(Singapore High Court No 705 of 1990). The District Court felt that discovery 
information obtained in civil proceedings should not be subject to the Riddick 
principle provided the public interests in both criminal and civil proceedings are 
the same. The Riddick principle was explained by the District Court as preventing 
use of documents disclosed in criminal proceedings in unrelated civil proceedings. 
Reference should also be made to the decision of Chan Sek Keong J (as he then 
was) in Reebok International Ltd v Royal Corp [1992] 2 SLR 136. 
86 Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 18 at [50]. 
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151 The fact that Odex’s legal status as the holder of a “non-
exclusive contractual license” was insufficient to confer locus standi to 
sue in the civil courts for copyright infringement does not mean that 
they did not have a genuine commercial interest to stop the 
infringements over and above the interest that any law abiding member 
of the public has in seeing copyright law followed. If Odex had applied 
or intended to apply to the Attorney General for a fiat to prosecute the 
offenders (once identified) under the Copyright Act, would a fiat have 
been granted?87 
152 If a fiat could have been obtained under the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, would it be outside of the policy of the 
extended Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, 
especially given the “unique self help regime” in Singapore which places 
great responsibility on IPR owners to resort to the civil and criminal 
system to protect their rights? Of course, Odex were not the copyright 
owners; but then again, neither are criminal provisions intended only to 
protect the specific/direct victim of a crime. 
153 These are hard questions that admit of no easy answer. The fact 
that a person has the right to lay a complaint that a crime has been 
committed cannot of course make that person a victim of the crime for 
these purposes. But does it follow that if any person can make a 
complaint that anyone is also entitled to seek a fiat to prosecute, and 
that if he/she does, that the fiat will be granted even though the 
complainant is not directly affected by the crime (over and above his 
position as a member of the public)? Will it make a difference if fiats are 
only granted in those cases where the applicant has a real interest (over 
and above the interest that any law abiding citizen has) in securing 
compliance with the criminal law? If so, might such a person be 
regarded as a victim with a sufficient connection so as to support an 
application under the extended Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction?.88 
                                                                       
87 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) s 336(4): “The public prosecutor 
or the Solicitor-General or a person appointed a deputy … may authorize any 
advocate to act for him as Public Prosecutor in the conduct of any case or 
prosecution in court or in any part of such conduct.” See also AIPPI Reports. 
Report Q169: Criminal law sanctions with regard to infringement of intellectual 
property rights (Singapore) available at: http://www.aippi.org/ (accessed 16 August 
2008). See also The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights by Means of Criminal 
Sanctions: An Assessment, by Louis Harms JA for the Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement, WIPO November 2007, WIPO/ACE/4/3. 
88 If a thug stabs a person in the thigh resulting in a period of hospitalisation, the 
person stabbed is clearly a victim – but what then of his wife? Is she also a victim in 
the sense that she has an interest over and above that of any member of the public 
to see justice done? Similarly, given that Odex were the contractual licensee for 
Singapore, did they have a special interest such that they could be regarded as a 
victim of the copyright offences? If offences were committed by the subscribers 
under s 136(3A) of the Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed), it is at least arguable 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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Would not the spirit of justice and respect for the law that underlies 
Norwich Pharmacal support grant of relief? 
(3) Possible law reform: The position of a copyright licensee in 
Singapore 
154 As matters currently stand, a non-exclusive contractual licensee 
of copyright subject matter appears to be in a rather “exposed” position 
in Singapore so far as copyright infringements are concerned. Such a 
licensee has no title sufficient to bring proceedings for copyright 
infringement and he also lacks any equitable title/interest that might 
enable him/her to apply for interlocutory relief. He may be able to lay a 
complaint before the authorities in those cases where the infringement 
involves commission of a crime but will not be able to pray in aid the 
extended Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction to discover the identity of the 
wrongdoers. He can, of course, have recourse to his licensor and to 
persuade/require (depending on the terms of the licence) the licensor to 
sue for infringement and obtain injunctive relief (assuming the licensor 
is the copyright owner or the exclusive licensee). Whether substantial 
damages can be obtained given that the licensor may have suffered no 
loss is quite another matter. Is this a satisfactory position? Those who 
support less copyright and free or freer access to copyright subject 
matter online are likely to agree with the position. However, arguments 
for and against copyright control of subject matter on the Internet and 
private use take the debate to a different and higher plane. Given the 
existing copyright law, is there a case for strengthening the rights of 
non-exclusive licensees and, if so, how? 
                                                                                                                               
that Odex were victims (in a broad sense) in their own right. Note that the High 
Court also made the point that if Odex were allowed to obtain information for the 
purpose of criminal proceedings, then the court would have to confine the use to 
those criminal proceedings. But, see Ransome/Tempil Inc v Romar Positioning 
Equipment (Singapore High Court No 705 of 1990) and also Reebok International 
Ltd v Royal Corp [1992] 2 SLR 136. Would it be against the public interest to allow 
the identity information to be used by the copyright owners to sue for the parallel 
civil copyright infringement that founded the assertion of criminal wrongdoing? 
Although this is not an easy question to answer, a good argument can be made that 
the Riddick principle has limited application in such a case. See later for a fuller 
discussion. Finally, compare also the remarks in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] 2 WLR 
920 that an exclusive licensee of an IP right who finds that the value of his licence is 
reduced by the defendant’s infringing activity has no claim against the defendant 
for his losses under the economic torts of inducing breach of contract or causing 
loss through use of unlawful means as the exclusive licence is not as such interfered 
with. See Lord Hoffmann at 943, 944 and 960. Lord Walker at 994. Citing RCA 
Corp v Pollard [1983] Ch 135 and also Isaac Oren v Red Box Toy Factory Ltd [1999] 
FSR 785. However, the problem in those cases was that exclusive licensees under 
the Dramatic and Musical Performers Protection Act 1958 (“RCA”) and the 
Registered Designs Act 1949 did not enjoy a right of suit. Indeed, under the former, 
there was no civil cause of action at all. This does not mean that the licensees did 
not suffer direct real economic losses as a result of the defendants’ activities. 
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155 One possibility will be to grant a non-exclusive licensee a right 
of suit for copyright infringement. This is already the law in the UK. In 
2003, the UK amended its copyright legislation so as to permit a non-
exclusive licensee to bring proceedings for infringement in respect of an 
infringing act directly connected with a prior licensed act of the 
licensee.89 
156 Another possibility will be to directly address the issue of 
internet user/subscriber anonymity by introducing a specific statutory 
provision which allows the copyright owner or a person authorised to act 
on the owner’s behalf to request an ISP to reveal the identity of alleged 
infringing subscribers.90 Another approach may be to revisit the 
question as to whether Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction extends to 
aiding the victim of a crime. If the Singapore Court of Appeal endorses 
this extension, then the issue as to who is a victim for this purpose will 
need careful examination.91 
157 The question as to whether changes should be made in the light 
of the Odex litigation is unlikely to go away anytime soon; if anything, it 
may become more urgent in the context of the US-Singapore FTA. On 
this, it is perhaps worth mentioning that the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (“IIPA”) in its 2008 Special 301 Submission to the US 
Trade Representative (“USTR”) has cited the Odex litigation as a point 
of concern. The IIPA makes a number of points. First, that in Singapore, 
it is generally hard to obtain information on infringing subscribers from 
ISPs as the latter insist on a court order before release of information. 
Does this meet the requirement of an “expeditious” mechanism for right 
holders to use? Second, complaint is also made of the fact that 
Singapore law does not at present allow representatives of the copyright 
owner to initiate civil proceedings. These are clearly difficult points 
                                                                       
89 See now s 101A of the Copyright, Designs, Patents Act (UK) 1988. The licence 
must be in writing and must expressly grant the non exclusive licensee a right of 
action. 
90 See, for example, s 512(h)(i) of the US Circular 92 Copyright Law of USA 
contained in Title 17 of the US Code and mentioned in Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific 
Internet Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 18 at [36].Indeed, it appears that the concept of allowing 
a person to be authorised to act on behalf of the copyright owner is not alien to the 
US-Singapore FTA (see the correspondences referred to in the Odex case at [31] et 
seq). 
91 Of course, another self-help measure will be to insist on an exclusive licence or 
assignment of the rights in issue or to join in the copyright owners/exclusive 
licensees. Requiring an exclusive licence or assignment instead of a non-exclusive 
licence depends on the bargaining position of the parties and a myriad of other 
commercial considerations. Requiring the copyright owner/exclusive licensor to 
assist by suing and enforcing the rights may work in some cases but not all. Often 
times, the copyright owner will be a foreign rights holder whose main interest in 
Singapore is exploitation via contractual licences. It may make far more sense in 
such a case for the non-exclusive licensee to be given a right of suit in his own 
name: a step which the UK took in 2003. 
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which may be taken up by the USTR at some stage. It should be said that 
the 2008 Special 301 Report did not in fact take up these points. 
Singapore was not listed in the 2008 Report. That said, it is perhaps 
understandable that Singapore’s ISPs have taken a “cautious” approach 
on requests for information about subscribers. Given the uncertainties 
in the law and the existence of confidentiality/privacy obligations 
(whether contractual or in respect of regulatory telecommunication 
licence terms), it is not surprising that ISPs will require a court order 
before release of the information. Indeed, even in the UK, it is noted 
that the stance taken in some cases by website administrators is to insist 
on a court order whilst adopting a neutral stance in the application. ISPs 
and website administrators who are innocent of the commission of the 
wrongdoing by their subscribers naturally feel a “caught in the middle” 
syndrome.92 
(4) The threshold to activate Norwich Pharmacal in Singapore 
158 In the Odex case, the District Court applied the standard 
required in Anton Piller applications: demonstration of an “extremely 
strong prima facie case of wrongdoing”. On this basis, even if the 
applicant was an exclusive licensee for some of the copyright subject 
matter in issue, he held that there was insufficient proof of 
wrongdoing.93 In coming to this conclusion, the learned District Judge 
stressed that the “plaintiff must put forward their best evidence for the 
Court to decide if there is a strong enough case of wrongdoing meriting 
the discovery order”. This, with respect, must be right and where the 
evidence comprises use of technical software and usage analysis, some 
                                                                       
92 In Hong Kong, Ma J (as he then was) in A Co v B Co HCMP336/2002 observed that 
where the innocent facilitator is in some legal relationship with the wrongdoer (as 
will usually be the case), any discovery made by the innocent party may well apart 
from a court order expose that innocent party to liability – civil or criminal and at 
the very least a breach of confidentiality. See also the discussion of a similar point 
in the context of costs in Totalise plc v Motley Fool Ltd [2001] EWCA 1897. At first 
instance, the judge had held that whilst the innocent party had to carry out a 
balancing exercise (within Norwich Pharmacal) that on the facts (perfectly plain 
defamatory postings) they should have complied with the requests made for the 
identity of the wrongdoer. But on appeal, the Court of Appeal came to a different 
view at para 28 that “it is legitimate for a party who reasonably agrees to keep 
information confidential and private to refuse to voluntarily hand over such 
information”. That said, the position would be different if the party was actually 
implicated in the wrongful act. In Singapore, see also Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet 
Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 18 at [62] where Woo Bih Li J makes the point that whilst Pacific 
Internet may have been subject to contractual and regulatory duties of confidence, 
it could not be seriously suggested that they would be in breach if it made 
disclosure pursuant to a court order. See also Sheffield Wednesday Football Club Ltd 
v Hargreaves [2007] EWHC 2375 where the defendant to a Norwich Pharmacal 
application (website administrator) neither opposed nor consented to the 
application (in respect of defamatory postings). 
93 Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2007] SGDC 248 at [25] et seq. 
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independent support as to the reliability of that evidence may well be 
very important indeed. That said, the standard required, namely, an 
extremely strong prima facie case, does not sit well with the policy 
behind the jurisdiction. In some cases, the fact that a wrongdoing has 
been committed may well be obvious; but as the cases have shown, there 
will be cases where the information is needed precisely to determine 
whether or what range of wrongdoings have been committed and how 
the claim is to best advanced or formulated. Where there is doubt as to 
whether any wrongdoing has been committed, this should tell against 
grant of the order. But where there is a good arguable case that some 
wrongdoing has been committed and there is uncertainty as to how the 
case is best formulated or what approach is best taken to remedy the 
wrongdoing, the position is rather different. In such cases, the better 
approach, with respect, is that taken by Woo Bih Li J in the appeal: the 
strength of the case is one of the factors to be considered in totality in 
deciding how to exercise the discretion.94 
(5) The alleged wrongdoings 
159 In the Odex litigation, the claim was founded on the assertion 
that the anime titles enjoyed copyright in Singapore as a species of 
cinematograph film. Under s 83 of the Copyright Act,95 film copyright 
includes the exclusive right to make copies of the film and also to 
communicate the film to the public. Users who made and stored copies 
of the titles in their computers (uploading) so that these were available 
to other users via P2P access, might well have been liable for the making 
of unauthorised copies as well as for making available to the public.96 
Users who downloaded copies to their own computers would also be 
liable for infringing the exclusive copying right.97 
                                                                       
94 Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 18 at [61] citing Kuah Kok Lim v 
Ernst & Young [1997] 1 SLR 169 and KLW Holdings v Singapore Press Holdings Ltd 
[2002] 4 SLR 417. In the latter case, Choo Han Teck J stated that generally in pre-
action discovery the guide to be applied was “the interest of justice”. See also above 
at n 67. Note also that in the Odex case, the High Court allowed an application by 
some copyright owners to be added as plaintiffs. This overcame the locus standi 
problem. Some additional evidence was also submitted to the court on the matter 
of proof of wrongdoing. On this basis, the High Court allowed disclosure in respect 
of the video titles (copyright subject matter) of which the successful applicants 
were the copyright owners. 
95 (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed). 
96 See s 103(1) and s 83 of the Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed). Note that for the 
purposes of this discussion it will be assumed that no defence (such as fair dealing) 
is applicable. 
97 An attempt to argue the defence in s 114(1) of the Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev 
Ed) did not get far in the Odex litigation. That section provides that the copyright, 
inter alia, in a cinematograph film that is included in a broadcast or cable 
programme is not infringed by the making of a film of the broadcast or cable 
programme for the private domestic use of the person making the copy. Woo Bih 
Li J’s tentative view was that a cause of action had been established on the available 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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160 What then of the criminal provisions? Section 136(3A) provides 
that an offence is committed by certain types of wilful infringement of 
copyright so long as the extent of the infringement is significant or the 
person commits the infringing act so as to obtain a commercial 
advantage.98 
161 To what extent is an infringing uploader caught by this criminal 
provision? The uploader is making a copy of each film title into his 
computer and he may also be making that copy available to the public, 
all without the consent of the copyright owner. Although he may not be 
committing these acts for the purpose of sale or hire, might he still be 
caught by the penal provisions of s 136(3A)? It seems improbable that 
the infringement will be regarded as one resulting in any commercial 
advantage and much will therefore depend on whether the infringement 
is significant. Section 136(6A) lists four factors for the court to take 
account of: the volume of articles that are infringing copies; the value of 
those articles; whether the infringement has a substantial prejudicial 
impact on the owner of the copyright; and finally, all other relevant 
matters. Suppose an uploader has copied 100 film titles into his 
computer and that these are then made available on the Internet for 
swapping, etc, is the infringement significant? This is a deceptively 
simple question that admits of no easy answer. Significant by reference 
to what standard or from which perspective: 
(a) the number of articles which contain infringing copies; 
(b) the number of infringing copies in any given article; 
(c) the number of infringing copies where the copyright 
belongs to the same person; 
(d) the number of infringing copies of the same work or 
subject matter; or 
(e) the number of infringing copies of works or other 
subject matter irrespective of who the copyright owners are? 
162 An infringing uploader/downloader may well have scores or 
even hundreds of illicit copies in his hard drive. In many cases, they will 
                                                                                                                               
evidence notwithstanding s 114. See Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2008] 3 
SLR 18 at [71]. There is much to be said for this as it does not appear that s 114 is 
relevant to the facts of the case. 
98 Note that s 136(5) extends these provisions to cinematograph film copyright. For 
an example of a prosecution based on commercial advantage see PP v PDM 
International Pte Ltd [2006] SGDC 91. Note that s 136(3A) was enacted in 2004 as 
part of the measures to implement the US-Singapore FTA. See also the discussion 
by the Industry Functional Advisory Committee on IP Rights for Trade Policy 
Matters available at: http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
Singapore_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file273_3234.pdf (accessed 16 August 
2008). 
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be copies of different works, films and other copyright subject matter. In 
many cases, the copyright in the works and other subject matter may 
belong to many different owners. It may even be possible that for the 
copyright film in issue, he only has one infringing copy that is stored in 
his hard drive. So far as that copyright film is concerned, is the 
infringement significant given that there is only one electronic copy of 
that film in one hard drive controlled by the user? The number of 
articles appears to be just one hard drive! The number of infringing 
copies in that hard drive is voluminous, if we ignore the fact that they 
are copies of different works/subject matter. However, the number of 
infringing copies of the film in question is just one copy! But even so, 
the effect of that one infringing copy on the interests of the copyright 
owner is significant in that it leads to considerable downstream 
prejudicial impact. Given that s 136(6A) is a criminal provision of 
general application and given that the copyright law is intended to apply 
to the Internet, it seem unlikely that Parliament would have intended 
s 136(6A) to be limited to cases where the volume of physical hard 
copies is high. After all, the problem that copyright owners face is that in 
the world of electronic communications and the Internet, physical 
copies are no longer relevant in the distribution/making available 
pathway. A single electronic copy made available on one hard drive 
linked to the Internet may spawn a thousand daughters: many more 
infringing copies than would otherwise have been made and distributed, 
etc, by means of physical copies.99 
163 But what of the downloader who “simply” makes infringing 
copies of many films which he then stores on his computer hard drive or 
on CD/DVD-Discs? The home downloader may not be making any of 
these copies available to others, whether on the Internet or by other 
means. They may all be made for his personal/family pleasure. Leaving 
aside any possible application of a fair dealing defence, has such a 
downloader committed a criminal offence under s 136(6A)? This is no 
easy question to answer. Certainly, Professor Jayakumar speaking in 
Parliament opined that the section was not intended to catch a person 
who commits infringement by occasionally downloading an article or 
song from the Internet for his own personal enjoyment.100 But what if 
that person is downloading regularly large amounts of copyright 
material without consent? What if the downloader has only made a 
single copy of any particular copyright work or subject matter (eg, a 
film) on his hard drive or on some storage device, is the infringement 
                                                                       
99 See the example given by Professor S Jayakumar, Deputy PM and Minister for Law 
in Parliament and set out in Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 18 at 
[74]. 
100 Referred to in Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2008] 3 SLR 18 at [74]. Note that 
the Minister for Law stressed that even here the home downloader may still be 
liable in a civil action for infringement. 
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significant? If the downloader is not making that infringing copy 
available to others on the Internet, the impact on the copyright owner of 
that single infringing download in respect of the copyright in that film 
is unlikely to be significant. Does it matter that he has also downloaded 
and made copies of many other copyright films (whether these all 
belong to the same copyright owner or not)? Whilst this is clearly a 
matter that requires careful appraisal, there is something to be said for 
the view that any ambiguity here should be interpreted against criminal 
liability.101 In the case of uploading and making available to the public, a 
single infringing copy can result in substantial prejudice. In the case of 
downloading which does not lead (or perhaps cannot lead) to any 
further making available, the question as to whether the infringement of 
any given copyright is criminally significant seems much less certain.102 
(6) Scope of Norwich Pharmacal in Singapore 
164 Leaving aside the issue of locus standi to apply under O 24 r 6 
and/or the residual inherent jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal 
orders where necessary in the interests of justice, questions remain over 
the scope of the inherent jurisdiction to grant pre-commencement 
discovery orders. Earlier, the extension and current scope of the Norwich 
Pharmacal jurisdiction in England has been briefly touched on and will 
not be repeated here. It seems probable that the Singapore courts accept 
that the jurisdiction is not confined to torts and will extend to 
wrongdoings in general. Whether this will include crimes (in the 
absence of matching civil wrongs) has not yet been authoritatively 
determined although the indications certainly point in that direction.103 
165 An important point that arises from the Odex litigation in 
Singapore concerns the applicability of the Riddick principle to 
documents/information discovered pursuant to a Norwich Pharmacal 
order. The principle states a general rule that documents discovered 
                                                                       
101 See the very helpful discussion by Saw Cheng Lim & Susanna Leong, 
“Criminalising Copyright Infringement in Singapore: Who are the Real Online 
Culprits” [2007] EIPR 108 and especially at 113. 
102 Saw Cheng Lim & Susanna Leong, “Defining Criminal Liability for Primary Acts of 
Copyright Infringement-The Singapore Experience” JBL 2008, 4, 304. The authors 
make the point that an individual downloader who habitually downloads copies for 
his own use might in aggregate leave an overall prejudicial impact on the 
entertainment industry as a whole. That said, the authors assert that this is not 
relevant as the inquiry is directed towards the impact on particular copyright 
owners. 
103 Other issues will include use of Norwich Pharmacal to obtain information to assist 
in the formulation of the claim against a known wrongdoer as well as whether 
orders can be obtained to help enforce or obtain remedies against a known 
wrongdoer such as by means of tracing or other claims for restitution. As in 
England, Norwich Pharmacal relief will not be available against a mere witness. See 
Sim Leng Chua v Manghardt [1987] SLR 205. 
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under court order must not be used for some ulterior or alien purpose. 
To this end, the successful applicant for discovery will usually be 
required to limit the use of the material to the proceedings in respect of 
which discovery was sought.104 For example, in Sim Leng Chua v 
Manghardt, the plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract 
against a company. In the course of that action, he obtained discovery of 
certain documents which contained alleged defamatory statements 
made by the “director-general adjoint” of the company. A defamation 
action was commenced against the director-general who then applied to 
strike the defamation action out on the basis that it was caught by the 
Riddick principle. The Riddick case concerned use of documents 
discovered in proceedings for wrongful dismissal, in subsequent 
proceedings, against the same defendants for defamation. Chan Sek 
Keong JC (as he then was), after surveying the English case law, found in 
favour of the striking out application. The point made was that if the 
contest was characterised as one between a private interest to protect 
reputation and the public interest in administration of justice which 
required that the confidentiality of discovery documents be protected, 
the defendant was bound to win as there was no authority where a court 
has allowed a private interest to outweigh a public interest.105 But was the 
plaintiff ’s assertion of a right to protect his reputation purely a matter 
of private concern? The court rightly accepted that there may be a 
genuine public interest in upholding private rights; after all, society 
must benefit from the protection of individual rights.106 Even so, the 
court’s view was that even “if there were a public interest in his being 
allowed to litigate or enforce his rights in court, it would not override 
the public interest in full and frank disclosure in discovery 
proceedings”.107 
166 Full and frank disclosure in discovery proceedings has often 
been said to be “a most valuable aid in doing justice”. That said, the 
Riddick principle demands a balancing of the competing rights and 
interests and requires respect for the public interest in privacy and 
confidentiality. Thus, it has been said that discovery under compulsion 
is an invasion of a private right to keep one’s documents to oneself and 
that “discovery should not be pressed further than the course of justice 
requires”. If the court permitted the use of the documents for some 
ulterior or alien purpose, there was a real danger that the “courts 
themselves would be doing injustice”.108 The Riddick principle arises 
where the discovery is under compulsion pursuant to a court order; it 
                                                                       
104 Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 (“Riddick”). 
105 [1987] SLR 205 at 213. 
106 Indeed, this lies at the heart of Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction: a point referred to 
by Chan Sek Keong JC (as he then was) at p 213. 
107 [1987] SLR 205 at 214. 
108 Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 and cited by Chan Sek Keong JC 
at [1987] SLR 205 at 214. 
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does not apply where one party has voluntarily disclosed documents in 
the course of legal proceedings.109 
167 Does the Riddick principle apply to documents/information 
discovered pursuant to a Norwich Pharmacal order? Several points may 
be worth noting. To begin with, in its original form, the Norwich 
Pharmacal order was concerned with discovery of the identity of the 
wrongdoer against whom the plaintiff/applicant wished to commence 
civil proceedings for a specific tort (patent infringement). Thus 
confined, there appears to be no good reason not to apply the Riddick 
principle. The discovery is under compulsion to enable, in the interests 
of justice, specific proceedings to be brought against the wrongdoer. The 
interference with the innocent facilitator’s right of privacy is balanced 
against the interest of justice. However, the Norwich Pharmacal 
jurisdiction has since developed into a broader form covering cases 
where the information is needed to help the plaintiff/applicant 
formulate his claim and to decide which of several paths he will take to 
remedy the wrongdoing, from bringing legal proceedings to taking self-
help action such as dismissal of the errant wrongdoer, etc. If the policy 
that moves Norwich Pharmacal is to assist a victim of a wrongdoing to 
find relief in the law, there may be something to be said for greater 
exercise of discretion when considering Riddick type restraints. 
168 Second, there is the point that in Singapore, copyright and trade 
mark owners are often granted fiats to conduct private prosecutions 
alongside civil proceedings for copyright and trade mark infringement. 
That being the case, does it make sense to require the copyright owner 
to restrict his use of the information to the initiation of civil 
proceedings given that public policy in Singapore strongly supports 
copyright owners instituting criminal proceedings to protect their rights 
and given also the tentative movement in Singapore towards accepting 
Norwich Pharmacal relief so as to enable a victim of a crime to initiate 
criminal proceedings? 
                                                                       
109 See Hong Lam Marine Pte Ltd v Koh Chye Heng [1998] 3 SLR 833. Singapore Court 
of Appeal. L P Thean JA delivering the grounds of decision referred to the view of 
Browne-Wilkinson VC in an earlier English case that a litigant who voluntarily uses 
documents in the litigation has himself destroyed the privacy of the document: not 
the plaintiff or the court. The earlier English case was Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon 
(No 2) The Times (20 October 1988). But query whether in the light of recent 
developments in confidentiality and privacy (pursuant to the Human Rights Act 
1998 UK) a document that has been used in litigation no longer possesses any 
quality of privacy? See, for example, Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 WLR 1232. 
Even if privacy is not necessarily destroyed by such a disclosure, the fact remains 
that the Riddick principle is founded on an implied undertaking from the party 
who seeks and obtains court ordered discovery. Where disclosure was voluntary, 
L P Thean JA rightly notes at p 844 that the other party would not be subject to an 
obligation express or implied to the court not to use the documents save for the 
proceedings in question. 
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169 An important decision that touches on this point is Microsoft 
Corp v SM Summit Holdings Ltd.110 In that case, copyright/trademark 
owners had obtained search warrants under s 62(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Code111 in respect of alleged criminal offences under the 
Copyright Act112 and Trade Marks Act113 of Singapore. Subsequently, the 
copyright/trademark owners were ordered to return all the items that 
had been seized from the alleged infringer. Later, the alleged infringer 
commenced proceedings for defamation arising out of statements made 
at a press conference held soon after the search raid. The 
copyright/trademark owners wished to use some of the documents and 
information obtained pursuant to the IP search warrants in the defence 
to the defamation proceedings. 
170 The argument was made that the Riddick principle was 
inapplicable to copyright and trademark infringements because of the 
“self-help” regime of enforcement of IPR in Singapore whereby fiats 
were commonly granted to the IPR holder to commence criminal 
proceedings.114 These arguments were accepted by L P Thean JA who 
stated that: 
I[I]n Singapore there is this unique regime of self help where civil and 
criminal proceedings are part and parcel of the enforcement of an 
owner’s intellectual property rights, and not infrequently they are 
initiated in parallel proceedings by owners of intellectual property to 
enforce their rights. In such cases, it would be unrealistic and overly 
technical to say that documents and information obtained by owners 
in criminal proceedings are subject to an implied undertaking 
analogous to the Riddick principle and the owners are precluded from 
using them in civil proceedings, and vice versa, when both sets of 
proceedings are taken to enforce the same intellectual property rights 
…
115
 
171 Whilst this important qualification to the Riddick principle was 
accepted, the Court Appeal did not think that it was relevant in the 
actual circumstances. The documents and information obtained 
pursuant to the IP search warrants were not going to be used in parallel 
civil suits for copyright or trademark infringement. Instead, they were to 
be used in civil proceedings unrelated to the enforcement of IPR. The 
Court of Appeal rightly concluded that the same considerations of 
public interest in protecting privacy and confidentiality of documents 
                                                                       
110 [1999] 4 SLR 529. 
111 (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed). 
112 (Cap 63, 1999 Rev Ed). 
113 (Cap 332, 1999 Rev Ed). 
114 These arguments were made by Mr V K Rajah (as he then was) citing 
Ransome/Tempil Inc v Romar Positioning Equipment (22 October 1990) and also 
Novell Inc v Ong Seow Pheng [1993] 3 SLR 700. 
115 [1999] 4 SLR 529 at 548. 
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and information and in ensuring full and frank disclosure in the 
administration of justice, which are present in the application of the 
Riddick principle, should apply to the case then at hand.116 
172 Thus, coming back to the Odex litigation, if the 
plaintiff/applicant was properly to be regarded as a victim of criminal 
copyright infringement, would a Riddick type restraint arise if a Norwich 
                                                                       
116 L P Thean JA explains that the execution of the search warrants was a clear 
invasion of privacy and confidentiality and was subject to an implied undertaking 
on the part of the recipients of such documents and information not, without leave 
of the court, to use them other than in proceedings for the enforcement of the IPR. 
See [1999] 4 SLR 529 at 548. That said, L P Thean JA stressed that the duty was 
owed to the party who gave discovery and to the court and that it is for the court to 
control, modify or release (if the interest of justice so requires) a party from the 
implied undertaking. The implied undertaking even where it arises is not absolute 
and can be varied in an appropriate case. To complete the Summit saga, 
applications were then made to the court to vary and/or release the defendants to 
the defamation suit from the implied undertaking so that the documents and 
information could be used in the defence to the defamation suit. (In essence, it 
appears that the defendants wanted to rely on the defence of justification and that 
the documents and information in question were apparently helpful in that 
context.) These applications (by criminal motion) came before Yong Pung How CJ 
and were dismissed. See Microsoft Corp v SM Summit Holdings Ltd [2000] 1 SLR 
343. Chief Justice Yong, in denying the applications, noted that the burden lay on 
the applicants to provide cogent and persuasive reasons and that a very important 
consideration was the overall interests of justice. The Chief Justice rightly stressed 
that the purpose of the implied undertaking was to protect privacy and 
confidentiality and that exceptional circumstances were needed before the court 
would exercise its discretion in favour of variation. Note that the Chief Justice also 
noted that at close of pleadings in the defamation suit, the defendants would be 
entitled to discovery in those proceedings which discovery might well give them the 
very documents in question. That being so, the Chief Justice felt there was no 
reason why the applicants should not have to go through the ordinary discovery 
procedure without using the prohibited information before its time. An appeal was 
subsequently dismissed on grounds of want of jurisdiction. See [2000] 2 SLR 137. 
Finally, in the defamation action, the defendants applied for discovery and the 
application eventually reached the Court of Appeal in February 2000. The crux was 
whether the defendants were entitled to discovery of any documents falling within 
the ambit of Chief Justice Yong’s original order and/or implied undertaking in 
respect of the criminal search warrants. This was a tricky issue and decided in 
favour of the defendants on the basis that the documents were now sought as a 
result of some other information acquired independently of the search warrant 
raids. The reliance on such independent information did not in any way infringe 
the plaintiff’s right to privacy and confidentiality which the implied undertaking 
sought to protect. See Business Software Alliance v SM Summit Holdings Ltd [2000] 
2 SLR 733 and also at [2001] SGHC 94. Other cases touching on the court’s 
discretion to vary the implied undertaking include: Mopi pte Ltd v Central 
Mercantile Corp (S) Ltd [2004] SGHC 41 (Tan Lee Meng J); Beckkett Ltd v Deutsche 
Bank AG [2005] 3 SLR 39 (Woo Bih Li J) and on appeal at [2005] 3 SLR 555 
holding that there were two requirements before a variation might be granted: 
cogent and persuasive reasons and absence of injustice or prejudice to the person 
who had given discovery. There was no need to demonstrate some overriding 
public interest. 
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Pharmacal order was granted so as to enable the initiation of criminal 
proceedings? Suppose that the applicant wanted to pass on the 
information to the copyright owners so that the latter could bring civil 
proceedings for infringement, would this be caught by an implied 
undertaking, given that the applicant had a real commercial interest in 
the copyright owner’s action which was closely related to the criminal 
proceedings?117 
(7) Impact of Odex litigation on IPR 
173 The Odex litigation clearly raises an important question as to 
the status of non-exclusive licensees of copyright subject matter. Beyond 
this, it raises an important question of policy that goes to the heart of 
copyright and the information age: how should we address the 
economic and commercial needs of creators and authorised 
exploiters/distributors of copyright subject matter in the face of 
substantial copying by individual internet users who have the advantage 
of anonymity and in some ways consumer/public sympathy? Copyright 
owners assert that the number of infringing copies made and/or 
disseminated by individuals are enormous and translate into huge 
losses. Just how large those losses are may be quite hard to establish for 
it does not follow that every home copyist would necessarily purchase a 
licensed original even if unauthorised copies were not readily available 
through the Internet. 
(8) Impact of Odex on privacy and IPR 
174 Whether or not Singapore recognises a “right to privacy”, the 
Norwich Pharmacal cases and the Odex litigation clearly demonstrate 
the need for a proportionate balancing of competing interests. Even if 
the threshold is met and a case made out for the grant of pre-trial 
discovery against an innocent party, it bears repeating that the 
jurisdiction is discretionary. In the case of applications under O 24 r 6, 
this is subject to O 24 r 7 which provides that the court should only 
grant the order if necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or 
saving costs. In the case of applications under residual inherent 
jurisdiction, the Norwich Pharmacal line of cases clearly stresses the 
importance of looking at all the circumstances before deciding how 
equity’s discretion is to be exercised. These must include the nature of 
the relationship between the innocent party and the alleged wrongdoer 
and the weight of any confidentiality obligation that the innocent party 
is subject to.118 This is not to say that confidentiality obligations have 
                                                                       
117 In any case, once the prosecution takes place, the identity of the criminals will be 
known and presumably a matter of public record. 
118 See, generally, Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft Singapore 
Branch[2003] 1 SLR 375 and also KLW Holdings Ltd v Singapore Press Holdings Ltd 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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primacy, for it must be borne in mind that the public interest that 
supports confidentiality duties also recognises the importance of 
allowing victims of wrongdoings to remedy the wrong. Equitable 
principles of confidentiality as well as international conventions such as 
the ECHR recognise that important though obligations of 
confidentiality and/or privacy are, these cannot be used as a shield to 
mask serious wrongdoings. 
VIII. Privacy revisited: Some concluding thoughts 
175 Much ink has been spilt on privacy by philosophers, 
sociologists, ethicists, lawyers and members of the public in general. 
Have we now reached a position where we can say with confidence that 
there is a “right of privacy”? In some respects, the answer will depend on 
who is asking the question and in what context. 
176 Privacy as a social expectation or as a rule of ethical behaviour 
or as a social norm is clearly very much in evidence. Privacy, it has been 
said, protects the moral capital in inter-personal relationships and 
enables an individual to develop different relationships with different 
degrees of informational intimacy. Privacy, it has also been said, is 
important, not just because it forms the basis of individual respect and 
social cohesion, but it also permits or encourages an individual to 
explore and develop his or her character, personality and capabilities to 
the full.119 
177 Much more difficult is the question whether there is a legally 
enforceable general right to privacy that imposes broad based 
                                                                                                                               
[2002] 4 SLR 417. Both these cases raised issues concerning discovery and 
confidential information/relationships. In the latter case, Choo Han Teck JC held 
at [10] that confidentiality obligations may have more significance in pre-action 
discovery applications and that “prima facie, in such circumstances, the courts are 
entitled to lean in favour of confidentiality. What is spoken in confidence ought to 
be kept in confidence. Confidentiality must, therefore, be observed unless the 
greater interests of justice demand otherwise. The burden of proof lies with the 
applicant.” But, where the information is necessary to enable the victim of a 
wrongdoing to identify the wrongdoer, the balance starts to shift in favour of 
discovery (bearing in mind other factors such as the severity and nature of the 
wrongdoing, etc). For discussion, see Jeffrey Pinsler, “Analysis of Recent Cases on 
discovery and Interrogatories” Law Gazette, July 2003 (1). 
119 See N W Barber, “A Right to Privacy” [2003] Public Law, Winter 602–610 and also 
generally Wei, “Milky Way and Andromeda: Privacy, Confidentiality and Freedom 
of Expression” (2006) 18 SacLJ 1. See also Disa Sim, “The Right to Solitude in the 
United Kingdom and Singapore: A Call for a Fundamental Reordering” Loyola of 
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, 2002, Vol 22:443 at 446 that the right to 
solitude helps to promote important social functions. It buffers individuals from 
societal pressures to conform and protects from ridicule and censure. It gives 
individuals the opportunity to relax, reflect and experiment. 
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obligations on members of society individually or as a whole. Not all 
countries with written constitutions expressly recognise a right of 
privacy as one of the fundamental liberties of its citizens. Many will, of 
course, recognise freedom of expression or freedom of speech alongside 
other “fundamental” rights such as freedom of religion, but what of a 
right to privacy? If privacy is fundamentally about the right of an 
individual to live his/her life “in peace”, to be left alone, then in some 
senses the fundamental liberties safeguarded in Part IV of the Singapore 
Constitution are precisely about putting flesh on this principle.120 There 
are of course significant international documents recording the 
importance attached to a right of privacy (alongside freedom of speech, 
etc). These include Art 12 of the UDHR 1948 and Art 8 of the ECHR 
1950. 
178 In Europe and the UK, much attention has been paid to 
developing/expanding protection for informational privacy in recent 
years. In fact, the European framework for this derives from the ECHR 
1950, a convention born in the immediate aftermath of World War 2: a 
war that epitomises abuse of human rights! The current urgency, 
however, has much to do with the development of the information 
society and the impact of information technology and electronic 
databases on the ability of an individual to retain control of his/her 
personal information. Then too there have been the tremendous 
advances in medicine, genetics and the unravelling of the human 
genome. Developments in modern life sciences have helped open the 
door to many new lines of therapeutic medical research, many of which 
will require the use of genetic information and disease 
profiling/distribution that will depend in turn on access to medical 
databases and patient information. It is no surprise that protection and 
exploitation of personal data has become a major industry in Europe (as 
well as many other countries) and has spawned a host of data protection 
laws.121 
                                                                       
120 By this what is meant is that even though the Constitution makes no express 
reference to a right of privacy, the value of privacy permeates many of the 
identified fundamental liberties. But see Wacks, “The Poverty of Privacy” [1980] 
LQR 96 who makes the point that part of the problem with commonly cited 
privacy arguments (such as abortion) is precisely that privacy has become confused 
with other issues. See also Thio Li-Ann, “Pragmatism and Realism Do not mean 
Abdication. A Critical and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s Engagement with 
International Human Rights Law” (2004) 8 SYBIL 41 at 46 that there is no 
constitutional right to privacy. See also Eric Barendt, “Privacy as a Constitutional 
Right and Value” in Privacy and Loyalty (P Birks ed) (OUP, 1997) ch 1 and 
M Beloff QC, “Fundamental Freedoms in a Written Constitution” Law Gazette, 
January 2008. 
121 In Europe, see Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Electronic Commerce Directive 
2000/31/EC and Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications 2002/58/EC. 
In the UK, see the Data Protection Act 1998. 
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179 This does not mean that countries like the UK now recognise a 
general stand alone legally enforceable right of privacy.122 Instead, the 
approach taken has been to recognise that privacy as a value can and 
should be used to shape and develop the law in a manner that is 
consistent with her obligations under the ECHR 1950 and the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK). In the area of informational privacy and Art 8 of 
the ECHR, the English approach has been to “shoehorn” Art 8 (privacy) 
into the equitable action protecting confidential information. This has 
required significant expansion or adjustment of the action so far as 
private information is concerned; a matter that has been explored in a 
number of significant cases of late and which will not be explored 
here.123 
180 The question that arises for us in Singapore is whether deeper 
broader protection for privacy as a social value is needed and, if so, how 
this is best achieved. This is a huge question that goes well beyond the 
confines of this article. What follows, by way of conclusion and 
overview, is a list of some points that have arisen or which are bound to 
arise for consideration. 
181 First, in the area of spatial privacy (the right of quiet 
enjoyment), is there a need to introduce legislation so as to create a 
statutory tort of harassment? At present, aside from actions in nuisance, 
the High Court in Singapore has responded affirmatively with the 
exciting development of a common law tort of harassment in 
Malcomson Nicholas Hugh Bertram v Naresh Kumar Mehta 
(“Malcomson”).124 Will this development be affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal or will the contrary view that the decision, though laudable in 
terms of policy, is a step too far or too fast and one that is better taken 
by Parliament win the day? Perhaps the time has now come to move on 
and to focus on refining the principle set out in Malcomson (for 
example, available defences or exceptions) than to question the basic 
premise of the decision.125 
                                                                       
122 Whilst it may be appropriate to use loose terminology (a right to be let alone) to 
describe privacy as a social value, it is quite another matter to use that loose 
terminology to carve out legally enforceable rights of wholly uncertain scope and 
application. 
123 G S S Wei, “Milky Way and Andromeda: Privacy, Confidentiality and Freedom of 
Expression” (2006) Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 18, 1-58. See also Disa 
Sim, “The Right to Solitude in the United States and Singapore: A Call for a 
Fundamental Reordering” Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review, 2002, 
Vol 22: 443. The most recent English cases being Murray v Big Pictures Ltd [2008] 
EWCA Civ 446 and Max Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777. 
124 [2001] 4 SLR 454. 
125 See Tan Keng Feng, “Harassment and Intentional Tort of Negligence” [2002] Sing 
JLS 642. Note that the Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs and law, AP Ho 
Peng Kee stated in Parliament on 12 March 2004 that the Government’s view was 
that no new laws were needed at that stage to deal with harassment and stalking. 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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182 Second, given the views expressed in the Malcomson case, will 
the Singapore courts in general take the view that even though 
Singapore is not subject to the imperatives of European law, that privacy 
as a socially important value can and should be recognised in 
developing existing legal principles (where necessary and on a 
proportional basis)? 
183 Third, in the area of informational privacy, how will the 
Singapore courts and law makers respond to the developments that have 
taken place in the UK, Australia and New Zealand where the action to 
protect confidential information has acquired a broader role to protect 
personal private information as opposed to confidential personal 
information? In particular, will Singapore law move to a position where 
the litmus test for protection of personal information under the law of 
confidence is founded on some notion of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy?126 
184 Fourth, leaving aside expansion of the equitable action to 
protection confidential information, provisions against unauthorised 
access to computers in the Computer Misuse Act,127 specific statutory 
provisions governing particular industries such as banking and so forth, 
is there a case for a general statute on data protection governing the 
                                                                                                                               
The Minister points out that there are penal provisions already such as those found 
in s 506 of the Penal Code as well as ss 13A and 13B of the Miscellaneous Offences 
(Public Order and Nuisance) Act as well as the Computer Misuse Act. So far as 
civil remedies are concerned the Minister noted the Malcomson decision as an 
important point since Lee Seiu Kin JC (as he then was) in that case underscored the 
importance of safeguarding privacy in this crowded world and the need for the 
common law to respond. See http://www.mha.gov.sg/news_details.aspx?nid=790 
(accessed 16 August 2008). 
126 In Europe, see in particular Von Hannover v Germany [2004] EMLR 21 and also 
Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 719. In England, see Campbell v MGN Ltd 
[2004] 2 AC 457; Douglas v Hello! [2001] QB 967, [2001] 2 All ER 289, [2006] QB 
125, [2005] EWCA 595 and [2007] 2 WLR 920; A v B [2002] EWCA 337; HRH 
Prince of Wales v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EWHC 522; and Murray v 
Express Newspapers [2007] EWHC 1908 and on appeal at Murray v Big Pictures Ltd 
[2008] EWCA Civ 446. In Australia, see Grosse v Purvis 2003 QDC 151; Australian 
Broadcasting Corp v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 199 but see also 
Giller v Procopets [2004] VSC 113 and Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] 
FCA 763. In 2006, the County Court of Victoria held that a right to informational 
privacy existed in Australia. See Jane Doe v ABC [2007] VCC 281. Whilst it has 
been reported that the case has been appealed, the author understands that the 
litigation has been settled on confidential terms. In New Zealand, see Hosking v 
Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1. In the UK, the leading text is now Tugendhat & Christie, 
The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford University Press, 2002). For discussion 
of the Campbell decision, see Saw Cheng Lim & Gary Chan, “The House of Lords 
at the Cross Roads of Privacy and Confidence” (2005) 35 HKLJ 91. 
127 (Cap 50A, 2007 Rev Ed). 
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collection, processing, use and dissemination of personally identifiable 
data?128 
185 Aside from the various common law actions and specific 
statutory provisions that have an impact on privacy, some countries 
have already put into place elaborate legislation to specifically protect 
the privacy of data subjects where personal data is collected and 
compiled. The immediate advantage of such data protection legislation 
is that the law can be made of general application (as opposed to 
specific statutory provisions that only deal with confidentiality/privacy 
in a specific context).129 
186 The first time data protection laws were given serious 
consideration in the UK was by the Younger Committee Report on 
Privacy.130 This was in connection with the growing impact of computer 
systems on privacy. The Younger Report led to a Government White 
paper131 and a further Lindop Committee Report132 – all of which were in 
favour of some form of data protection legislation. At the same time, 
movement was taking place in Europe. In 1981, the Council of Europe 
Data Protection Convention came into being.133 Failure to ratify would 
have placed the UK at a disadvantage as other countries which had 
ratified were allowed to refuse the transfer of data (personal 
information) to other countries who did not provide comparable 
                                                                       
128 Data protection legislation should not be confused with database laws. The latter is 
concerned with protecting the effort and labour that goes into the making of a 
database: the interests of the compiler dominates the landscape here. Data 
protection laws, on the other hand, are concerned with safeguarding the privacy 
interests of the data subjects. 
129 For a discussion of privacy and the Internet (with a good description of use of 
cookies to garner personal information from the Internet), see Lim Yee Fen, 
Cyberspace Law, Commentaries and Materials (Oxford University Press, 2002). The 
first international document on data privacy is the Guidelines Governing the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data formulated by the 
OECD. In Europe, the first attempt to deal with data privacy dates back to the 
Council of Europe Convention on the Automated Processing of Personal Data 
1981. See notes at p 138 that problems arising from different levels of 
implementation within the EU countries resulted in fears that Members with 
strong protection would move to restrict data flows to members with less 
protection. This led to calls for a Directive to harmonise the position in the EU. See 
Directive 95/46/EC 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to processing 
of Personal Data and on Free Movement of Such Data. For an article supporting 
Data Protection legislation for Singapore, see Vili Lehdonvirta, “European Union 
Data Protection Directive: Adequacy of Data Protection in Singapore” [2004] SJLS 
511. For a New Zealand perspective, see Gunasekara, “The Final Privacy Frontier? 
Regulating Trans-Border Data Flows” 2007 15 Int’l JL & InfoTech 362. 
130 Cmnd 5012, 1972. 
131 Cmnd 6533, 1975. 
132 Cmnd 7341, 1978. 
133 The Convention only came into force later upon ratification by five States. 
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protection. The UK accordingly needed to pass data legislation so as to 
ratify the Convention. 
187 The current UK Data Protection Act 1998 sets out further 
toughened standards intended to protect the rights of data subjects in 
respect of the collection, use and dissemination of personal data.134 The 
interface with privacy in general is clear. Indeed, married with a broader 
privacy driven approach to personal/private confidential information 
and a statutory law on harassment, it would be fair to say that a higher 
level of protection for privacy is now available in the UK. 
188 The Data Protection Act 1998 is also to be seen as part of the 
efforts to harmonise the law within the EU. The Directive and the Act 
make it expressly clear that so far as other countries are concerned, a 
principle of material reciprocity is to be applied where personal data 
from the European Economic Area is to be transferred to a foreign 
country. Such transfers are to be prevented unless the receiving country 
provides adequate protection under its own laws. This is also one of the 
new data principles.135 Thus far, there has yet to be any adjudication 
under the Directive as to whether Singapore is a country whose laws and 
professional standards offer equivalent (adequate) levels of protection 
for personal data.136 
                                                                       
134 For a discussion of the impact of data protection legislation on biobanks 
containing personally identifiable biological material under Danish law, see Johnny 
Petersen, “Biobanks and the Law in Denmark, Opinion” [2004] EIPR 383. 
135 The European Economic Area is defined in s 70 as a State that is a contracting party 
to the Agreement on the European Economic Area signed in 1992 and amended in 
1993. See also Art 25(1) of the Data Protection Directive. This provides that 
Member States can only allow transfer to a third country of personal data 
undergoing processing if the third country provides an adequate level of 
protection. Factors as to whether the level of protection is adequate are set out in 
Art 25(2). These are the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the 
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country of 
final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third 
country in question and the professional rules and security measures which are 
complied with in that country. It is understood that the European Commission has 
set up a working commission on Art 25 charged with the task of developing 
guidelines as to adequacy of data protection laws in third countries. See generally 
the EU Data Protection website at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/index_en.htm (accessed 
16 August 2008). 
136 See, generally, Johanna Tan, “A Comparative Study of the APEC Privacy 
Framework – A New Voice in the Data Protection Dialogue?” (2008) Vol 3 Issue 1 
Asian Journal of Comparative Law. Tan argues (rightly) that the EU approach to 
data protection is top down with privacy and human rights being the governing 
principle behind strong protection whereas the APEC Privacy Framework, whilst 
based on OECD Guidelines 1980, places greater stress on free flow of information 
and global commerce as opposed to protection of privacy per se. In this way, Tan 
explains that the APEC Framework has been criticised by some commentators as 
being “OECD Lite”. 
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189 Aside from the various common law and equitable actions 
which are capable of protecting certain aspects of privacy and personal 
data, there is no general law on privacy as such. In particular, no specific 
legislation has been passed on data protection, although there have been 
government sponsored industry based self-initiated moves in that 
direction. 
190 The Infocomm Development Authority in Singapore (“IDA”), 
for example, explains that in February 2002, the National Internet 
Advisory Committee (“NIAC”) released a draft “Model Data Protection 
Code for the Private Sector” which is modelled on internationally 
recognised standards.137 The IDA and the National Trust Council 
(“NTC”) conducted a public consultation on the code. Based on 
comments from the industry and members of the public, the Model 
Code was fine-tuned and released in December 2002 for private sector 
adoption. The Model Code is said to be a “generic code” that is available 
for adoption by the entire private sector.138 
191 The Model Code applies to any private sector organisation that 
collects and installs personal data in electronic form, online or offline, 
using the Internet or any other electronic media. Further, in the e-
commerce area, the NTC has aligned its trust mark programme with the 
principles of the Model Code.139 The Trustsg mark is administered by the 
                                                                       
137 http://www.ida.gov.sg (in particular OECD Guidelines) (accessed 16 August 2008). 
138 The Model Code (version 3.1) is based on ten principles: (i) Accountability (an 
organisation is responsible for personal data in its possession/custody). (ii) 
Specifying purposes (the purposes for which personal data are collected shall be 
specified. (iii) Consent (knowledge and consent of the individual is required for 
collection, use and disclosure subject to certain exclusions). (iv) Limiting collection 
(collection of data to be limited to the specified purposes). (v) Limiting use, 
disclosure and retention (subject to certain exemptions, personal data not to be 
used or disclosed to a third party for purposes other than those for which it was 
collected, unless consent is obtained). (vi) Accuracy (personal data to be accurate, 
complete and up to date). (vii) Safeguards (personal data to be protected by 
appropriate security safeguards). (viii) Openness (to make readily available 
information about its policies and procedures for handling personal data). (ix) 
Individual access and correction (the right subject to conditions for the individual 
to be informed on request of the existence, use and disclosure of his personal data 
and to challenge accuracy and to require amendments). (x) Challenging 
compliance (an individual to be able to address a challenge concerning compliance 
with the principles to the designated person or persons accountable for the 
organisation’s compliance). 
139 A report on the NIAC model code is available at: 
http://www.agc.gov.sg/publications/docs/Model_Data_Protection_Code_Feb_2002
.pdf (accessed 16 August 2008). See also at: http://www.wwlegal.com/module-
subjects-viewpage-pageid-48.html (accessed 16 August 2008). Note also that in 
1998, Singapore’s National Internet Advisory Board issued an E-Commerce Code 
for Protection of Personal Information and Communications of Consumers of 
Internet Commerce. This voluntary self-regulation code controls collection and 
use of information on consumers. This code was adopted by CaseTrust as part of 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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NTC and is awarded to online traders who meet the NTC standards for 
sound ecommerce standards and practices.140 
192 The issue as to whether Singapore needs to go beyond self-
regulation and codes of practice is likely to resurface on an increasingly 
frequent basis in the years to come. The Singapore e-Government push 
to accelerate and broaden the use of the Internet to facilitate social 
intercourse in the 21st century, whilst welcomed, has raised concerns 
over the privacy of personal data. This concern has been recognised with 
the Government explaining that measures would be taken to “prevent 
information being spread around without the permission of the user”.141 
To this end, it has been reported that the Government has adopted a 
data privacy protection code. The code prevents government officers 
passing data to commercial companies without the explicit approval 
from the relevant individuals. Further, stored data is only to be used for 
the purpose for which it is collected.142 Whether a Data Protection Act 
will eventually be enacted in Singapore still remains to be seen.143 
                                                                                                                               
its code of practice. The latter is a joint project of Consumers Association of 
Singapore, CommerceNet Singapore Ltd and the Retail Promotion Centre 
Singapore. See http://www.cnsg.com.sg/archive/000410.html (accessed 16 August 
2008). 
140 Whilst the voluntary codes of good practice and self-regulation are important 
initiatives, it remains to be seen how these work in practice, the level of compliance 
and whether the EU will take the view that, overall, Singapore provides and 
adequate level of protection for personal data. 
141 See The Straits Times Singapore, 29 October 2004 at H4. 
142 A cursory visit to some Singapore Government websites also reveals that Data 
Protection Privacy statements are often set out for the user. See, for example, the 
Data Protection Privacy Statement of the National Environment Agency at: 
http://app.nea.gov.sg/cms/htdocs/article.asp?pid=1315 (accessed April 2008). For a 
recent extensive discussion of the APEC Privacy Framework, see Johanna Tan, “A 
Comparative Study of the APEC Privacy Framework – A New Voice in the Data 
Protection Dialogue?” (2008) Vol 3 Issue 1 Asian Journal of Comparative Law. Tan 
notes at p 28 that in 2006, the Minister for Information Communication and the 
Arts, Mr Lee Boon Yang recognised in Parliament the increasing importance and 
impact of data protection in Singapore and the need to protect personal data. The 
Minister explained that the Government was reviewing Singapore’s laws on data 
protection and stressed the need to balance protection of personal data against 
adoption of new technologies. 
143 See Lim Yee Fen, Cyberspace Law, Commentaries and Materials (Oxford University 
Press, 2002). At p 158, Professor Lim explains that in the US, the Department of 
Commerce adopted the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles in July 2000 in the 
expectation that these would satisfy the principles of the EU directive. Prior to this, 
different States within the Union employed different measures including legislation 
and self-regulation. The US Safe Harbour principles were promulgated so as to 
reduce the level of uncertainty and fears in respect of personal data flows from 
Europe. It is significant to note that the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles essentially 
uses the approach of self-regulation. The idea being that US companies choosing to 
comply would be treated as providing adequate protection for the purposes of the 
EU Directive. It is noted, however, that US companies that sign up might also be 
subjected to enforcement actions by the US Federal Trade Commission under the 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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193 Fifth, in the area of bio-medicine and life sciences, are there 
adequate safeguards for individual privacy bearing in mind the public 
interest in advancing medical therapeutic research and also disease 
control? This is clearly a very important area that comes close to the 
heart of the work of the Singapore Bioethics Advisory Committee. Some 
of the areas where privacy concerns may need to be addressed (indeed 
many have already been touched on by the Bioethics Advisory 
Committee) include the following: 
(a) The need for discussion, consensus building and 
possible regulation of unacceptable uses of genetic information 
(usually evidence of some genetic pre-disposition to disease) in 
the area of employment and insurance (genetic 
discrimination).144 
(b) Where medical databases are used to further research, 
discussion and consensus on the need to ensure adequate 
protection for patient identity in respect of medical and genetic 
information by removing personal identifiers and only allowing 
the use of anonymised data. 145 
                                                                                                                               
Federal Trade Commission Act. It is unclear as to how effective this has proven to 
be. As an alternative to signing up to the safe harbour provisions, US companies 
can also enter contracts with EU data providers that contain Directive compliant 
clauses. How effective these will be (especially viz privity of contract issues) also 
remains to be seen. For background information, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/index_en.htm (accessed April 2008). 
See also the useful summary and discussion by Morrison and Foerster LLP at 
http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/bulletins/bulletin1184.html (accessed April 
2008). In 2004, only four countries had been determined as providing adequate 
data protection: Switzerland, Canada, Hungary and the US. By April 2008, the list 
covered: Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, Guernsey, Isle of Man, the US 
Department of Commerce’s Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, and the transfer of Air 
Passenger Name Record to the US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection as 
providing adequate protection. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm 
(accessed April 2008). 
144 Wei, Introduction to Genetic Engineering, Life Sciences and the Law (Singapore 
University Press, 2002) at para 2.21 et seq. See also the Recommendations of the 
BAC, Personal Information in Biomedical Research, May 2007. See also the moves 
in the US to regulate genetic discrimination: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/americas/7366264.stm (accessed 16 August 2008). The US Senate has recently 
passed legislation banning genetic discrimination. This has now been passed by 
Congress and signed by President Bush. See Genetic Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA) 2008 signed in May 2008. 
145 See Wei, Introduction to Genetic Engineering, Life Sciences and the Law (Singapore 
University Press, 2002) at para 2.12. For an interesting English case, see R v 
Department of Health ex parte Source Informatics Ltd [2001] FSR 74. See also the 
extensive discussion by the BAC in its 2007 Report on Personal Information in 
Biomedical Research. Important questions as to effect of non-compliance with the 
rules governing de-identification will also have to be addressed. Will the 
patient/individual be given a cause of action for breach of statutory duty? Other 
issues relating to the degree of anonymization are bound to arise. 
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(c) Discussion and consensus building on when and under 
what circumstances it is acceptable for the identifiable patient 
information to be made known (in the name of the public 
interest).146 
(d) Discussion and consensus building on centralised 
patient medical report/test databases with the goal of improving 
the quality of patient health care (where the patient is 
consulting several medical practitioners) and so as to reduce 
wastage and unnecessary repeat medical tests.147 
194 These then are some of the questions that will need to be 
addressed in Singapore and indeed by the international community as a 
whole. The Odex case is important, not just because of the hard 
questions of black letter copyright law that had to be dealt with, it is also 
important because it underscores the difficult and complex balancing 
act that the law is required to perform between competing interests and 
rights in society. In the area of IPR, the Odex case clearly recognises the 
                                                                       
146 Under the law of confidence, there is a well-established defence that permits 
unauthorised use of confidential information where this is necessary to protect 
some counter balancing public interest. For examples see W v Egdell [1990] 2 WLR 
1990 (psychiatric report) and also Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 for 
lengthy discussion of the need to disclose information regarding a drug addiction 
in the context of the public interest and role models. In the area of infectious and 
communicable diseases, consider also the need to disclose patient information to 
the Health authorities for disease control and also to facilitate contact tracing, etc, 
such as for severe acute respiratory syndrome or HIV infection. See Infectious 
Disease Act Cap 137. Consider also the need for a national disease registry to 
facilitate research on disease prevention and control such as cancer. In these cases, 
use of patient identifiable information may be necessary. See National Registry of 
Diseases Act 2007. 
147 It has been said that with a graying population, health care costs are going to rise 
considerably in Singapore and other countries. The argument has been advanced 
that a centralised patient medical report/test database will do much to stream line 
medical treatment and reduce costs. Clearly under such a system, great care will be 
needed to build robust safeguards to protect patient confidentiality against 
unauthorised use. Tricky questions also arise here as to whether the benefits of 
such a system justify the reduction of patient anonymity vis-à-vis medical 
practitioners. What if the patient has his/her own reasons for not wanting his 
“new” doctor to have access to his previous medical reports/tests taken at a 
different clinic? Will this include psychiatric tests that a patient has voluntarily 
undergone? Will any such scheme be applied also to dentists? What about other 
service professions where second or third opinions are sought? Is there a risk that 
such a system may result in some patients who would otherwise seek treatments in 
Singapore, moving to other medical hubs where centralised patient databases are 
not kept? How will a centralised medical database be regarded in Europe where 
even stronger protection is generally required for special categories of personal data 
including health information. See Johanna Tan, “A Comparative Study of the 
APEC Privacy Framework – A New Voice in the Data Protection Dialogue?” (2008) 
Vol 3 Issue 1 Asian Journal of Comparative Law at n 26. In raising these issues, the 
author notes that he has no knowledge/experience of the actual practice in 
Singapore or elsewhere on the compilation and use of medical databases. 
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need to balance the “right of privacy” against Singapore’s interest in 
protecting IPR. As the District Court judge rightly stated: “the right to 
privacy can never be equated to a right to steal intellectual property in 
secret.”148 In the area of bio-medical research, the need is to balance 
patient privacy against the need for access to information for medical 
therapeutic research, disease control and any other wider public interest 
that may be relevant, such as crime control and so forth. The balance is 
complex for it involves the privacy interests of the individual, the 
commercial interests of bio-medical research bodies as well as the 
interests of the public at large whose contributions may well include 
public funding/support for some areas of commercial medical research. 
 
                                                                       
148 Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2007] SGDC 248 at [38]. 
